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R496

# The United States Senate

## Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

7600003041

Friday, July 11, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

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COMMITTEE MEETING

- - -

Friday, July 11, 1975

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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:40 a.m., in Room S-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker, Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Lombard, Patrick Shea, David Aaron, Robert Kelley, Frederick Baron and Michael Madigan, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.

Mr. Bundy, would you please stand and take the oath.

Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Bundy. I do.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.

TESTIMONY OF McGEORGE BUNDY

Mr. Schwarz. Would you state your full name and address for the record, please?

Mr. Bundy. My name is McGeorge Bundy. I live in New York. My home address is 1040 Fifth Avenue.

Mr. Schwarz. And you are currently the Chairman or the President of the Ford Foundation?

Mr. Bundy. The President of the Ford Foundation.

Mr. Schwarz. In the Kennedy Administration what position did you hold?

Mr. Bundy. I was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Mr. Schwarz. And you held that all the way through the Kennedy Administration and for how many years in the Johnson Administration?

Mr. Bundy. I held that office from the beginning of the Kennedy Administration to the end of February 1966.

Mr. Schwarz. Prior to commencing work with the Kennedy

Administration, had you had anything to do with the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Bundy. I had a brother who worked for many years in the Central Intelligence Agency. I occasionally talked with members of the Agency during the forties and the fifties, both about substantive questions of what one thought about the conditions in the Soviet Union, and occasionally also about efforts that they were then making to recruit talented graduates of colleges.

Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned your brother. To put something of a different kind in the record than we have gotten recently, would you recount the position taken by Allan Dulles in connection with the problem that your brother had in the 1950's.

Mr. Bundy. Well, my brother came under attack from Senator Joseph McCarthy. And the ground was, as I recall it, in general that he had been a friend and supporter of Alger Hiss and was therefore not to be trusted in a place as sensitive as the Central Intelligence Agency.

Allan Dulles -- and my impression is that this was quite characteristic of him -- took an extremely firm stand on this matter, and stood by his estimate that my brother was in fact in no sense a security risk, rather, to the contrary. And the defense was successful, and my brother continued in the Central Intelligence Agency until the Kennedy





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Administration came in, at which time he moved over to the Defense Department.

Mr. Schwarz. We have indicated to you that we are going to discuss the countries of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, although not much on Vietnam. And the majority and minority staff have shown you some documents of that period, some 15 years ago. Before I get to those three countries, I would like to ask you some questions about a subject called Executive Action. Have you ever heard of the subject called Executive Action?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.

Mr. Schwarz. When did you first hear of it?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I have told your staff, that is a real difficulty for me, because I cannot pinpoint the time at which I heard of it. My impression was that it was some time in the early months of 1961.

Mr. Schwarz. And do you have a recollection as to the context in which you heard about it, the person from whom you heard about it, and will you provide to the Committee your full recollection of the subject of Executive Action in the early 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Would it help if I try to describe in a general way what I now understand of this matter, the part which is recollection and the part which is clarified by discussions with the staff and what I now think about it?

Mr. Schwarz. Would you distinguish, though, the part that is recollection and the part that is based upon other matters?

Mr. Bundy. That is exactly what I would like to do.

The part that is recollection is very vague. And I would say that I have no recollection of more than one conversation on this subject. And the impression that sticks in my mind is that I was told about it in a general way. And it was described to me as an effort to study through the possibilities by which one might act against an individual in a context other than that of espionage and counter-espionage, a context more political.

Mr. Schwarz. When you say "act against an individual", act in what fashion?

Mr. Bundy. Act in a variety of fashions, as I recollect it, but up to and including killing the individual.

The two things that I think are clear in my recollection about that -- three -- one, that it was a concept presented or described to me -- I was in effect being briefed on it.

Two, that it was entirely an untargetted -- that it was in no sense a plan to do anything to anyone.

And third, and I think quite important, that it was not anoperation which had any specific target.

Mr. Schwarz. You said you were in effect briefed on it. By whom?

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Mr. Bundy. That is what I don't know. I cannot recollect who it was. And I think it inapproprate to guess when I have no recollection.

Mr. Schwarz. What time? I don't mean what time of day, but what time?

Mr. Bundy. As I say, sometime I think in the early months of 1961. And searching memory is an uncertain business, but it sticks in my mind that I heard about it in the rooms of the Executive Office Building. And that would place it in time, because I moved from the Executive Office Building to the West Basement of the White House sometime after the Bay of Pigs, perhaps in May.

Mr. Schwarz. So based on that fact you place it in time sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs and sometime after--

Mr. Bundy. After my arrival in Washington.

Mr. Schwarz. And when did you arrive in Washington?

Mr. Bundy. About the 10th of January. I would place it more closely, because I think it was after I was in the Office of the Special Assistant, which, of course, was occupied until the 20th of January by others.

Mr. Schwarz. So you place it after the 20th of January, but before the Bay of Pigs, which was April 14 or 17?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. Did it come up in a context where you urged that such a capacity be created?

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Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. What context did it come up in?

Mr. Bundy. It came up in a context in which it was being described to me by someone else. And that is really about as far as I can take it with precision.

Mr. Schwarz. WAs it described to you by someone else as a capacity in being?

Mr. Bundy. As a capacity -- and this is not something I want to be too certain about, Mr. Schwarz, but my recollection would be that it was a capacity coming into being.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, receiving that information, did you take any steps to discourage or dissuade the person, whoever it was, who was describing to you the capacity coming into being?

Mr. Bundy. What I recollect is that I was satisfied with the description I received on two points.

First, that this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, that there should be a decision to move against an individual.

Being satisfied that these two things were not happening -- and I am now giving you a reconstruction rather than a precise recollection -- I am confident that what I did was

to place this notion in the category of hypotheticals, of things with no current urgency to them, and in that sense not a question that cried for attention in the sense that so many others did. If I may make a straightforward comparison, we were, I think, even before the inauguration, but certainly very quickly thereafter, very heavily engaged in a real question of choice, which was the question of choices around what would you do with the Cuban brigade which led eventually to the Bay of Pigs. And that occupied a very large amount of time and attention, as did the crisis in Berlin and the crisis in Laos.

In the same period there were briefings on contingency plans for the uses of nuclear weapons, other weapons, and a whole swarm of, sort of, and here were reports that came naturally to the Special Assistant's office, which was also being reorganized.

So, I think that what I did was simply to put this one aside. I cannot claim to have thought about it seriously, because it was in the flow of business that would come to the Special Assistant's office.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to see if we can be more precise on dates to check on what other evidence we have. We have other evidence that discussions of this matter were going on in the Central Intelligence Agency on the 25th and 26th of January 1961.

Now, are you able to testify with respect to the likelihood of the conversation you have recounted taking place prior to the 25th or the 26th of January 1961.

Mr. Bundy. I would rate it very, very unlikely. This is a matter I have thought about since you did mention those dates to me. And I would say that the chance that within the first four days after being sworn in I would have been drawn to consider this question is, from my side, as near zero as I can put it. I had been teaching international relations over a period of ten years. I was deeply interested in many of the immediate problems, most notably the problem of the crisis in Berlin and the concomitant question of relations with the Soviet Union. And I was preoccupied with all of the things that happened when you moved to Washington from helping the Secretary to buy a house, and working out a staff, and I was under instruction from the President to reorganize the White House National Security staff. This subject was far out of my mind, and I would not have brought it up. I doubt that anyone wouldhave brought it to me in those early days.

The Chairman. May I interrupt for a moment.

As I understand your testimony, Mr. Bundy, you were briefed on the concept of Executive capability sometime early in 1961, and you can't remember now who it was who briefed you.

Do you recall whether or not you instructed anyone at

the CIA to develop such a capability?

Mr. Bundy. I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment after I was briefed.

The Chairman. But your best recollection is that somebody toldyou that such a capability was being developed?

Mr. Bundy. I don't want to be too firm on that, but that would be my best recollection.

The Chairman. We received testimony from Mr. Bissell. Are you acquainted with Mr. Bissell?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, sir. I have known him a long time, and he has been a great friend of mine.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, since you are very familiar with the record, are you going to take Mr. Bundy through the record of Mr. Bissell's testimony?

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell testified --

The Chairman. And we have the transcript. If it would be helpful for Mr. Bundy to look directly at the transcript. I think he should have it.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell's testimony was, first, that in the first instance he said he did not recall any specific conversation. Then, however, he said, after having reviewed certain notes by Mr. Harvey, he concluded that if Mr. Harvey's note indicated, as they did, that he, Bissell, told Harvey in 1961 that he had been twice urged by the White House to set

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up an Executive Action capability, then he had no reason to doubt that testimony. And then he went on through a series of comments to end up saying that he would have been given that urging by either Rostow or Bundy, more likely Rostow.

First, let's focus on Rostow. Was Rostow involved in the briefing?

Mr. Bundy. No -- now, that I can't tell you out of my recollection, but only out of my knowledge of the way the office was organized. The first things we did, Walt Rostow and I, was to work out an informal but nevertheless reasonably clear-cut division of labor. And the whole business of what I thought of as special group business, namely, matters that related to covert action, and would, if they came for division, come through the special group, fell on my side of that division. I don't recall that Mr. Rostow was ever involved in any matter of this sort.

The Chairman. It is fair to say that this was Mr. Rostow's testimony.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissel is, as you say, a friend of yours of long standing, and still is a friend of yours?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, he is.

Mr. Schwarz. Wehave his testimony which, while it did have gradations within it, ended up saying that he believed either you or Mr. Rostow urged him to set up the Executive Action capability. And you have testified that the

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fact is that you were given a briefing, and you didn't urge it, but on the other hand you didn't say it should stop.

How can you explain, if you can, the testimony of your friend Mr. Bissell, and the contrast between that and your testimony?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understand Mr. Bissell's testimony -- and I should add, so that there will be no misunderstanding, that I have not only the advantage of discussions with you, but I have talked with him about it -- as I understand that testimony from that conversation, he was trying to explain a situation in which he had no reason to question an Agency history to the effect that he first gave instructions on this matter in February 1961. And in that context -- and he had no reason to question the report that he had received White House encouragement -- it is in that context that his speculations about Mr. Rostow and about me seem to fall.

I would be surprised, if his memory were refreshed with respect to the dates of January which you have described to me, if he were to believe that any initiative in this enterprise would come in the first instance from the Kennedy Administration.

The Chairman. Mr. Bundy, our transcript of the Bissell testimony makes it clear that Mr. Bissell himself does not dispute the documented record. He said in effect, if Harvey says that I told him that I had been twice instructed

by the White House to develop an Executive capability, I have no basis on which to dispute that record.

Then when we asked him, very well, who in the White House told you, and when were you told, he replied, it must have been early in 1960, and I don't recall who told me, but it must have been either Rostow or Bundy.

He then recounts that he had numerous conversations with both of you during the period, and concludes that the instruction must have come either from you or from Mr. Rostow.

Now, Mr. Rostow tells us he never gave such an instruction, and in fact has no memory of every having discussed such an instruction.

Mr. Bundy. He would have in fact have had no authority to give such an instruction.

The Chairman. That is right.

And he pointed that out.

Mr. Bundy. And in fact I wouldn't have the authority to give any such instruction, and I would have been only the channel to give such instruction.

Senator Baker. Who would have had the authority?

Mr. Bundy. If the authority were required outside the AGency it would have to have been the President himself.

The Chairman. What I would like to ask you --

Mr. Bundy. Could I continue with Senator Baker's question for one second.

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My own impression as to this matter -- and I have already testified to the fact that I am relying on a recollection of a meeting of which there is no record -- is that had I been briefed on this essentially hypothetical internal, undirected character, it did not appear to me to be a matter that required further authority outside the CIA. That may or may not have been right, but that is the quick judgment I appear to have reached. Because I certainly did not raise the question with others.

Senator Baker. Do you recall that, Mr. Bundy, or is that your surmise?

Mr. Bundy. That is my reconstruction more than my -- I know I did not raise it, I did not press the question, and I did not feel, therefore, that it was a question that needed further analysis, and it did not, so far as I know, get further consideration inthe White House. My own recollection is that I didn'thear the words again in any serious context that I can recall until this year.

The Chairman. And you cannot recall who it was who briefed you?

Mr. Bundy. I really cannot.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you narrow the field?

Mr. Bundy. I can narrow the field. It would have to have been a senior officer at the Agency, or someone with previous understanding in the White House. I have no reason to suppose

that it was the latter, but I cannot exclude that.

The Chairman. Might it have been Bissell himself?

Mr. Bundy. It surely might have been.

The Chairman. Based upon your best recollection of that briefing, you have already testified that you interpose no objection?

Mr. Bundy. I am pretty sure I satisfied myself as to the character of the enterprise. But I did not interpose an objection.

The Chairman. Do you recall, then, having reported the briefing to the President?

Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.

The Chairman. Did it strike you -- before I ask that question, based upon your best recollection of the briefing, were you told that this was a new capability that was being developed, or were you told simply that the Agency possessed such a capability?

Mr. Bundy. I would put it that the Agency was working on such a capability, but without any great sense of precision.

The Chairman. Were you given the impression at that briefing that the Agency was seeking your authority or the authority of the White House?

Mr. Bundy. I think they were testing my reaction, as I now look back on it. But I do not recall that they were seeking authority. If it had come to me as a matter of White

House authority, I know from the context -- my own concept of my job what I would have done.

The Chairman. What would you have done?

Mr. Bundy. I would have had to take the matter to the President, because I had no independent authority.

The Chairman. And you have testified that you did not take the matter to the President?

Mr. Bundy. As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Well, this is a subject dealing, as it does, with the development of a capability to kill that would have been of the character that if you had been asked for authority you would have discussed with the President?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

The Chairman. And furthermore, is it not a subject of a character that you would be very likely to recall?

Mr. Bundy. If I had been asked for authority I would recall it. If I were the initiating or deciding agent, I would recall that I had had that role.

You speak of the seriousness of it. It deals with a capability to kill. One of the sobering facts about coming into the government from outside into a sensitive position like that one is the number of things on which you are briefed which deal with the capability to kill. Contingency plans for protecting West Berlin, contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons -- shelf plans, a shade more remote, perhaps,



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for the use of different kinds of gases -- an operational plan for the invasion of Cuba -- these were uncertainties as to whether there would have to be military landings in Laos. In the context of 1961 -- and I am not in any sense trying to understate the seriousness of the context of 1975-- this was a hypothetical kind of a thing with two strong locks between it and any decision. And I simply didn't pay it the attention then that we are paying to it now. We are right to pay that attention now.

The Chairman. I understand that very well. And this Committee is endeavoring in every way it can to place this whole issue within the context of the time. Nevertheless, we are faced with a very real dilemma. We know that at the very time you were being briefed the Agency was not only interested in developing a capability, but was in fact engaged in a series of attempts to assassinate Castro, and had been involved in other murder plots and murder attempts against the leaders of certain foreign governments.

The question we are endeavoring to answer is whether the Agency had been authorized by the policy makers of the government to engage in this activity, or whether it was operating fast and loose on a wild gambit of its own in an area of extreme sensitivity that could have the most serious repercussions upon the government of the U.S. and its reputation in the world.

We are told by Mr. Bissell, who apparently was not only a very good friend of yours, but also a very good friend of Mr. Rostow's --

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

The Chairman. -- a man whose credibility as a witness would seem to have to be respected -- that he was at least engaged in developing such a capability on direct instructions from the White House.

But when we pressed him for specifics, his testimony becomes very vague. He can't remember just who it was who told him, he can't dispute the record, which says that in effect he so advised Mr. Harvey when he engaged Mr. Harvey to develop the capability. And everyone else of high authority in the Administration that we have questioned so far testifies that it was not the policy of the Administration to engage in assassination, and no such attempts were ever authorized, and indeed, with the exception of one occasion in the Special Group, the subject never even surfaced for discussion.

And when it did, if it did, it was quickly shot down.

Nevertheless, the CIA was in fact embarked upon such attempts during the period under review.

Now, we are led to conclude either that we are not being told the truth concerning the policy of the Administration, which is very hard for me to accept, given the reputation of the witnesses that have come before us, for integrity and

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truthfulness, or that the CIA was running wild, and acting on its own initiative, engaging in murder plots, murder attempts, and not informing, let alone securing the authority from, those in government who held the responsibility, which in a way is even more frightening.

Now, you tell us that you remember being briefed. You don't remember advising the President. It didn't seem too important at the time.Did you ever follow up on whether such a capability had in fact been perfected by the agency?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall pursuing the matter at all, Mr. Chairman, any more than I would have pursued any other shelf capability on which no question was being pushed to me, either from below or above.

If I may go back and comment on one aspect of your, I think, important and impressive description of the difficulty the Committee faces, I am sure that if in the early months of 1961 I had known what I now know, in part from the newspapers and in part from discussions with your staff, about what was really in train, I would have had a very different approach.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Yesterday Secretary Rusk testified before us. And some of the minutes or notes made following one of themeetings of the Special Group Augmented at least suggest

that the question of assassination occurred. And, Mr. Rusk said, did you think anyone would bring that up at a town meeting? And by that I gather he meant that these meetings had large attendance from all different groups and prinicples and staff assistants and so on, and as a result, if there were matters of exceeding delicacy, that was not the forum at which such matters would be discussed.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. Bundy. Yes. My impression would be that the Secretary was probably referring to the much discussed meeting of August 10, 1962.

Senator Mondale. Right.

Mr. Bundy. That was a large meeting, 16 or 18 people. And the comment seems to be pertinent to that meeting. The Special Group as such, the one which I would have had in mind, for example, in early 1961, was set up under a national security regulation of some sort whose number was 54/12.

Senator Mondale. That was the Special Group.

Mr. Bundy. That was the Special Group. And the Special Group in and of itself was quite a small group.

Senator Mondale. But people would volunteer to attend --

Mr. Bundy. No.

Senator Mondale. They would not?

Mr. Bundy. No. The meeting of August 10 is a very special meeting in a variety of respects. That included --

The Chairman. You were present at that meeting?

Mr. Bundy. I was present. My memory is entirely a refreshed memory on this, I had no recollection of the meeting until recent months. But I have found a scratch pad that I apparently doodled on on that date, and it shows who was there, and not much else.

Mr. Schwarz. There were some beautiful drawings.

Mr. Bundy. There were.

They were not very beautiful drawings.

The Special Group Augmented met in August -- and this does coincide with my general recollection of the matter -- in response to concerns wihch were first, I think, and most energetically pressed by Mr. McCone with respect to, what the hell are the Russians doing in Cuba. And that was the center of that meeting, and the center of later meetings, and the center of a national security action memorandum of considerable complexity which was put out toward the end of August, most of which dealt with this question, how do we know what they are going to do, what do we do if they do it, and so forth, with respect to missiles in Cuba.

It was therefore in a sense much more than an ordinary MONGOOSE meeting, let alone a Special Group meeting. And while I quite agree with the Secretary that that meeting as a planning session for anything as horrendous as assassination is implausible in the extreme. Quite serious covert

actions were discussed in the Special Group. And as your Committee pursues its studies of covert action it will find that that group is the nodal point for policy decisions, good or bad, well or badly handled. And that was quite a small group.

Senator Mondale. The reason I ask that is that it seems to me that the Chairman's question pursues the two alternatives, either what we now know to have occurred was ordered at the highest level, or at a very high level, such as the Special Group Augmented, or they operated on their own, in which case they were out of control and irresponsible, or there was some extra communications system that went around the formal structure that we have been examining, and would account for the sense of authority that these operators testified to when they were with us.

Now, their testimony was not very specific. They said, we thought we had authority, and we think we heard from somebody, and so on.

What are the changes, based upon your experience, that there was such extra official communications and order passing

Senator Baker. Before Mr. Bundy answers, I might say to Senator Mondale that I am struck by the first paragraph of the Inspector General's report, which we don't have here now, I don't believe, but as I remember it, it says, it is difficult to reconstruct history of assassination plots, because

of the high sensitivity of the subject matter, no written records were kept, and it was not discussed at open meetings. That is generally what was said. And it seems to me that is implying, then, that as a matter of policy there was no formalization of this sort of communication.

I am sorry to interrupt.

Senator Mondale. Yes.

And in that August 10 meeting two or three principals testified that it did come up. And in fact it is not reflected in the notes.

Mr. Bundy. Perhaps the best way for me to begin at least with an answer to your question is to describe my own sense -- my own understanding of the way in which covert operations of all types were brought forward. And this was perhaps the most important and the most constantly reiterated fact of the process that I was exposed to when I began to consider this whole range of subjects on coming to Washington. And whether it was with Mr. Gordon Gray, my predecessor, or with Allen Dulles, or with incoming and outgoing friends in the Department of State, or with Mr. Bissell, or with anyone else concerned with these matters, what I learned then and what I applied throughout my time there to the best of my ability was that all covert operations, whether intelligence operations, clandestine political activity, and clandestine propaganda activity, and clandestine subversion, or sabotage,

which did occur in the case of Cuba, all of them took their authority from and came for their authority to the 54/12 group.

And when there was a question in such a meeting as to whether the matter required further judgment, it was the responsibility of the Chairman of that group to make sure that that was checked out.

The papers will usually say, higher authority, et cetera, et cetera, and the President's name will often not appear -- any more than the precise character of the operation is likely to appear in the minutes for the reasons that Senator Baker has spoken of.

But I never knew of any operation of this kind of any sort, with one exception, which is quite different, which did not have that channel. The exception is the Bay of Pigs, which was so big, so complicated, and overflowed in so many directions, and in which the President himself was involved in so many ways, as he fully recognized and explained at the time, that it did not go through this Committee process, it went through a quite Presidential process, and everybody involved knew that.

But with that one exception, I would have told you up until the beginning of this current public discussion, that was the way it went, and that nothing went outside it, and that the Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agencies, with

their more sensitive intelligence operations, were meticulous in that respect.

Now, I clearly am wrong. But that is what I would have told you.

Senator Mondale. Well, are you wrong?

In other words, what you testified to --

Mr. Bundy. Excuse me, I misstate myself. I beg your pardon for interrupting.

I am wrong in that things happened that didn't go through that group.

Senator Mondale. Yes.

In other words, that is the big question, either they were acting on authority, which apparently flowed around channels --

The Chairman. Covertly --

Senator Mondale. Covertly -- or they were acting on their own, and our attempts to find direct authority in these official meetings led us nowhere.

And your testimony is that you find it very unlikely that there was this covert way of communicating authority.

Mr. Bundy. My testimony was that I wouldn't have believed it existed. I have to consider the same alternative that the Chairman has so clearly pointed out. I don't find it agreeable to conclude that the Agency was a rogue elephant at a time when I strongly believe it was not.

Senator Mondale. We asked General Taylor that question,

and he said he found it incredible to believe that they would have gone around the Special Group Augmented with such.

Mr. Bundy. General Taylor, of course -- and this is an important point -- was a-pointed to this responsibility after the Bay of Pigs, after a review of the failures that led to the Bay of Pigs, and after a conclusion had been reached that it would strengthen the White House to have a man with a particular responsibility for the oversight of intelligence operations. He was called military representative to the President, but in the announcement of his appointment -- I happened to look it up the other day -- President Kennedy made it clear that he would be his representative for intelligence matters. And he did in fact take over the chairmanship during the time that he was military representative of all of the Special Groups, 54/12, the Special Group Counterinsurgency, and the Special Group Augmented, MONGOOSE. And when he said -- if he has testified that his expectation would have been that nothing was going to go around him, he is saying exactly what I thought through the same period.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, in that respect --

The Chairman. Before I forget the question, let me ask, since you were at the August 10 meeting, and since we have received testimony buttressed by certain documentary evidence that the subject of assassination of Castro did come up at that meeting, do you have any recollection of

subject coming up or being discussed?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recollect the meeting. And I don't recollect the subject ever coming up in a meeting of that size, or indeed in any -- I don't have any recollection of it coming up, although I do have a general recollection of there being times at which this possibility was heard of. I wouldn't want to testify that I never heard anyone say, there is somebody thinking about this, because that would be different from my vague recollection.

But I have no recollection of that meeting, and therefore none of any specific statement made by anyone in it.

The Chairman. Senator Baker?

Senator Baker. In that connection, before I go to the question I had in mind, is it fair to say, Mr. Bundy, that all, or virtually all, of your testimony this morning, about MONGOOSE, about the August 10 meeting, and about the general situation, is from reconstructed memory rather than first impression memory?

Mr. Bundy. I didn't want to go that far, Senator Baker. My knowledge, my sense of what 54/12 and Special Group Augmented were, and where they stood in the line of authority, is very clear, and is not reconstructed. I spent five years -- except for the time when General Taylor was there, I was the chairman of these things.

Senator Baker. Let's take a piece at a time, then.

On the question of the Executive Action capability, I believe referred to as the ZRRIFLE project --

Mr. Bundy. Imust say that if I had known that was its name I would have looked harder, Senator Baker.

Senator Baker. It is a fairly picturesque name -- as to Executive Action Capability, or ZRRIFLE, do you have a separate recollection?

Mr. Bundy. I have a recollection of what I think of is one, I don't want to say there wasn't more, but of one discussion of the matter. And I know I was informed of it in some fashion at the time.

Senator Baker. Do you remember by whom?

Mr. Bundy. That is my difficulty, as I said earlier, I don't know.

Senator Baker. The reason I ask is, from the other documentation I have, which consists primarily of the Inspector General of the CIA's report, and maybe other material that I can't think of at the moment, it is clear and unmistakeable that they think of RZRIFLE or Executive Action Capability as a White House initiative, or a White House request of considerable insistence from the White House that they get on with the job.

Mr. Bundy. That is totally inconsistent with my unreconstructed recollection.

Senator Baker. Let me track that carefully.

Do you recall that there was not?

Mr. Bundy. I can only speak for myself here, and for my colleague Rostow, and my knowledge of his assignments. I recall that his assignments would have made it wildly out of place, and totally out of character, for him to initiate a matter of this kind. And I recall that I did not. And I recall that quite independently of any reconstruction of recent months.

Senator Baker. I would like to limit this, then, just to your assignment.

Was it your general assignment to take care of so-called covert operations?

Mr. Bundy. It was my assignment -- may I take a minute on this?

Senator Baker. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bundy. There were two ways in which I could become involved in covert -- three ways. I might have thought up an idea myself. I will have to say that I have no recollection that I ever did. It was not a subject in which I had an independent personal motivating interest. So, there were two ways in which I could get involved in it. One was by a proposal upward from the Agency or the Defense Intelligence Services, which would come to the Special Group.

And the other was when the President had an interest-- and I did have an interest -- from time to time in these

matters. He had a great interest at different points in 1961, 1962, in doing more about Cuba. And part of the more he wanted to do was covert. And he would say so to me. And I would say so to somebody else.

Senator Baker. Can you give us examples of that?

Mr. Bundy. No, I can't. I can only say that the kind of things he was talking about was, why do all these raids not get us anywhere? They say they can do something about the oil refineries, why don't they? These are purely hypothetical, Senator Baker, but they would be in a category, subversion and sabotage.

Senator Baker. WAs it Harvey that was spoken of as our 007?

Mr. Schwarz. Once yesterday.

SEnator Baker. Do you remember when Mr. Harvey was brought to see the President at the Oval Office?

Mr. Bundy. I have been told about that, but I am afraid that is non-refreshed recollection. I don't know anything about it.

Senator Baker. Would that have been the character of the things that the President was interested in, 007?

Mr. Bundy. I am not going to try to repair the record at this late stage and say that the President never read Ian Fleming.

Senator Baker. Or ever seen Ian Fleming?

Mr. Bundy. I don't think the President ever acted Ian Fleming.

Senator Baker. I think that is right. But I think it is important for us, Mr. Bundy, to try to establish, as the Chairman said, the range of available information or evidence that sheds some light on the three alternative possibilities, and the type of things that the President interested himself in is terribly important in that respect.

I believe that you said you had no information or no recollection of what particular situation, or what other deals that were made he was interested in.

Mr. Bundy. I will put it more concretely than that.

The President said, can't we do something more about Cuba? Why don't you get ahold of these people who are dealing with this and see if they can't do better, and pass the word that I am interested, that kind of thing.

Senator Baker. Do I understand that to mean that he never spoke of a particular practice?

Mr. Bundy. I can't tell you that, because I know, the record indeed reminds me, that particular actions that are related to Cuba that came up through the group of ten went to him, and some were approved and some were not.

So, he clearly looked at them.

I would have to have the documents there in order to be precise, and I don't have them with me.

Senator Baker. Which documents?

Mr. Bundy. Documents which the Committee staff has provided.

Mr. Schwarz. We have them.

Senator Baker. Tell me what they are.

Mr. Schwarz. November 30, 1961, Tab -- is that Tab H or Tab 4 about the November 30, 1961, which authorizes MONGOOSE?

Mr. Kelley. Tab 4.

Mr. Schwarz. May 5, '62, Lansdale Tab 21.

Senator Baker. Let's stop there, if I may.

Do you have a copy of this memorandum, Mr. Bundy?

Mr. Kelley. He will have it in a moment.

Mr. Bundy. One place these documents did not go is into the memorabilia of former members.

Mr. Kelley. We are talking about Tab 4.

Senator Baker. Mine says, see Lansdale Tab 4.

Mr. Kelley. Yes. November 30, 1961.

Senator Baker. I would really prefer if someone gave Mr. Bundy a copy of the same material I am working on.

Mr. Kelley. All right, that is the chronology.

Mr. Bundy. November 30, 1961?

Senator Baker. Yes, sir. It is on page 3, the third item.

Mr. Bundy. I have it.

Senator Baker. President Kennedy's decision to begin MONGOOSE. Is it clear, Mr. Bundy, that President Kennedy made the decision to initiate the MONGOOSE program?

Mr. Bundy. No question.

Senator Baker. I notice in the staff interpretation under the column "Issues and Questions" that they alleged that you recall probably writing this memorandum.

Mr. Bundy. That is really a logical inference. The President would not himself have written a long memorandum of instructions of this kind. It is possible that General Taylor wrote it. But I think it is more likely that I did. But in any event, whichever of us did so was doing it as a staff officer for the Prsident's convenience in recording his decision.

Senator Baker. So at least to this extent there is no question about the chain of command, or the chance to control it, the President authorized it?

Mr. Bundy. Just to underline that point, as I recall the paper which was shown to me, it is one from Mrs. Lincoln to General Taylor saying, the President wants you to have this as a description of the decisions.

Senator Baker. Would you repeat that?

Mr. Bundy. I think the covering memorandum on that document is from Mrs. Lincoln to General Taylor, and it says, the President wants you to have this as a record of his

decisions.

Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.

Do you have an independent recollection of the meeting or the encounter with President Kennedy in connection with MONGOOSE?

Mr. Bundy. Not a specific meeting, but of the process which led to this decision, yes.

Senator Baker. Describe for me, if you will, what MONGOOSE was intended to be?

Mr. Bundy. Well, MONGOOSE in a general way was the whole set of things to be concerned with mostly, but not only, covert activities against the Communist regime in Cuba.

Senator Baker. The chronology also quotes the memo as saying, one, we will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime.

Can you elaborate on that?

Mr. Bundy. Not without documentary assistance beyond what I have just said. It was to be a fairly wide ranging program. I believe that what that really sort of implies to me is that all departments are to cooperate, that the Committee is to review possibilities, proposals, to seek them out, and that the thing is to be coordinated by the Committee, whose chairman will be -- this summary doesn't say so, but my recollection is that the chairman was to be

General Taylor, and it does say that General Lansdale was to be the Chief of Operations.

The Chairman. I have some questions at this point, please.

Item 4 of this memorandum reads: "The NSC 54/12 Group will be kept closely informed of activities, and will be available for advice and recommendation".

Does this suggest to you that the regular channel was supposed to operate with respect to MONGOOSE, that is to say, a central role was to be played by the Special Group in connection with its activities?

Mr. Bundy. It is a puzzling sentence to me as I read it now. And I can't give you a precise answer on that. I think the general answer has to be that the 54/12 Group continu... through this period. General Taylor was the chairman of both. The overlapping of membership was extensive. And I think you would get a more precise answer as to the exact relation from General Taylor than I am in a position to give you.

The Chairman. I have a very clear memory of General Taylor's testimony. And his testimony was that the Special Group Augmented was the group that had charge of operation MONGOOSE. It was further his testimony that all plans, all operations, were to be brought to the Special Group Augmented for its approval. And the approval of that Group was necessary before any such plans were actually implemented.

Mr. Bundy. I would certainly be clear on that, Mr. Chairman. I thought you were asking whether there was a further requirement that it go from the Special Group Augmented to the Special Group. And I have no precise view on that.

The Chairman. I see.

Now, when you refer to the NSC 54/12 Group --

Mr. Bundy. That is what I think of as the Special Group.

The Chairman. That is what you think of as the Special Group.

I asked the question because the language is a little fuzzy.

Mr. Bundy. It is.

The Chairman. This language might suggest that there is an independent line of authority, and that the Special Group Augmented or the Special Group was simply to be kept informed, and its advice and recommendations would be taken under advisement.

Mr. Bundy. I think myself, Mr. Chairman, that we don't have a very serious problem here, because I would agree with General Taylor's recollection that the Special Group Augmented was the Cuba group.

Now, the Special Group is simply the same people less two or three. And the only real operational value of this paragraph is that perhaps the staff officer who serviced the

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54/12 would be available in a decision to the staff officer servicing the Special Group Augmented. But the decision-making persons are simply a smaller number of the very people that both General Taylor and I recollect as having the main responsibility.

The Chairman. So according to your best remembrance, you would agree with the testimony we have received from General Taylor?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would.

The Chairman. Mr. Smothers?

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Bundy, perhaps we could get some help in how the recollections come together here. I might pursue for just a moment some of the background regarding other sources of information you may have had regarding the subject matter of his testimony.

You indicated earlier that you had talked with Mr. Bissell about his testimony.

Did you talk with persons other than Mr. Bissell?

Mr. Bundy. Oh, yes.

Mr. Smothers. Did you talk with Mr. McNamara?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Smothers. Regarding these events?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Have you spoken with Mr. Gilpatric?

Mr. Bundy. NO, I don't think I have.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Rusk?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. McCone?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Are there others?

Mr. Bundy. I am sure there are. Mr. Rostow. Mr. Goodwin. There may well be others, Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Dungam -- who has very little to do with it, but I talked to them because of my own absence of recollection about the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise a few questions regarding those discussions, and perhaps it will be somewhat helpful to us in trying to piece this together.

Has any documentary evidence passed between you and the persons previously mentioned regarding the subject matter of these hearings?

Mr. Bundy. Not that I know of.

Mr. Smothers. Did Mr. McCone provide you any documentary evidence?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Smother. Did you receive any documentary evidence from any source other than the staff?

Mr. Bundy. No -- I beg your pardon. When I testified before the Rockefeller Commission I asked through that Commission whether I could look at NCS files particularly in

order to clarify my recollection of the 6th of August 1962. And I was allowed to look at the NSAM files. And my memory was refreshed by NSAM-1, which I believe the committee has.

Mr. Smothers. Have you made a similar request to persons now within the Agency for on the White House staff?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Smothers. Could we go back into your conversation with Mr. Bissell? Could you describe for the Committee, please, your reaction when Mr. Bissell indicated to you that he had in testimony before this Committee told the Committee that either you or Mr. Rostow had asked him to establish an Executive Action Capability?

Mr. Bundy. He didn't report it that way to me. He reported it to me that the testimony that had been given by others placed this event in February 1961. Testimony by others indicated that he had said to them that he had been encouraged to do this by the White House, and that in casting around as to who might have encouraged, he had given the names of Rostow and Bundy. I think this is roughly what he said to me.

The Chairman. That was the character of his testimony?

Mr. Bundy. I told him that I thought he must be wrong about Rostow, because that wasn't the way it worked, and that my own recollection was not that we had encouraged him, but that I had at some stage been informed about it.

We then went on to a discussion of what it was. And we agreed that whatever else it was, it was not an operation plan, and it was not targeted against anyone.

Mr. Smothers. What was his reaction to your comment that he had been informed as opposed to initiating?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that we had a very extended discussion on it. I don't recall his reaction, and I don't recall exactly how I put the point.

The Chairman. Let me just ask at that point, the way you have characterized Bissell's testimony correspnds with my memory of it. It is hard for me, however, to understand how Mr. Bissell -- why Mr. Bissell would have directed Mr. Harvey to develop such a capability, and apparently represented, if the documents are to be believed, to Mr. Harvey that he had been twice instructed to do this by the White House, if he had not in fact received such authority.

Do you think that Mr. Bissell would have undertaken on his own initiative to develop such a capability and simply represented to his subordinate that he was doing so on instructions from the White House?

Mr. Bundy. I think there is a prior question, Mr. Chairman, which is the credibility of the witness from whom he is taking this recollection.

The Chairman. That is fair.

Though Mr. Bissell himself did not seem disposed --

Mr. Bundy. Mr. Bissell may not recollect that I did not give him this instruction, but I do, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Did Mr. Bissell at any time during the period under question, or at any later time, ever inform you of CIA activities or involvement in assassination attempts against any foreign leader?

Mr. Bundy. No.

The Chairman. Doesn't it strike you as strange, since Mr. Bissell was aware of such attempts, that he would not have told him?

Mr. Bundy. Well, I don't want, for reasons that I have already explained, to speculate as to why he did or did not. I was operating, working on the assumption that I would know that kind of thing if it existed.

The Chairman. Senator Mathias?

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to leave the record, or Mr. Bundy's mind, or in the alternative, my mind, in a state of confusion as to what exactly Mr. Bissell's recollection was.

Now, he was depending somewhat on Mr. Harvey's recollection and notes in the first instance. But as I recall, he was very clear as a matter of independent recollection that he had been horsed along a couple of times by the White House on proceeding with the development of the Executive Action Capability. And that was a matter of independent recollection,

it didn't depend on anybody else's notes or anybody else's refreshing his recollection.

Mr. Bundy. That he didn't say to me, and I have no way of commenting on it.

The Chairman. I think we must carefully review the record on that score.

Senator Baker. It may be necessary to ask him to come back for that purpose.

May I ask a question there?

Mr. Bundy, do you have any recollection of any specific covert plans that would involve poisons, hypdermic syringes, or other potentially lethal devices in conjunction with activities against Cuba?

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specific plan. I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection that I heard the word poison at some point in connection with a possibility of action in Cuba. But that is as far as I have been able to take it in my own memory.

Senator Baker. Can you remember who may have mentioned it to you and what the purposes of the poison may have been?

Mr. Bundy. Nothing at all about it in detail.

Senator Baker. A poison pen?

Mr. Bundy. No, some kind of poison about which -- one thing that does stick in my mind is that it seems totally

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impractical because it was going to kill a large group of people in a headquarters mess, or something of that sort.

Senator Baker. Do you remember whether the plan was declared non-feasible or infeasible by the Department of Defense?

Mr. Bundy. No, I have no such recollection.

Senator Baker. Do you remember anything about a hypodermic syringe to carry poisons in a ballpoint pen?

Mr. Bundy. That is the sort of thing that I was asked the other day, and I said I remember it, and then it seems to me about ten seconds later was that what I was remembering was murder mysteries and nothing related to Cuba. I have no recollection of connecting anything like that to Cuba.

Senator Baker. I have another question, but I will wait, if you have something else.

The Chairman. Go ahead, sir.

Senator Baker. Do you feel that you have a good insight into the relationship between the President and his brother Robert Kennedy in this respect, that is, having to do with Cuba operations, and Robert Kennedy and Richard Helms?

Mr. Bundy. I have a pretty good picture of the relationship between President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy on Cuba, and on many other things. It is a recollection which grows stronger as the administration goes on, because I got to know them better, and, of course, they got to know me better,

and the relationship tends to become closer, my relation with both of them. I had known the President for many, many years, and the Attorney General much more briefly.

I do not have any clear picture of the relationship between the Attorney General and Mr. Helms. My curbstone judgment would have been that it was not close.

Senator Baker. Based on your insight, did the President delegate to Robert Kennedy substantial aspects of Cuba policy during the period we are speaking of?

Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't put it that way, Senator Baker. He certainly counted on the Attorney General to be a kind of gingerman on a great many subjects, of which Cuba and counterinsurgency were the two that came more closely within my area of interest.

Senator Baker. Counterinsurgency meaning what?

Mr. Bundy. Counterinsurgency meaning all those efforts like the Green Berets and organizing to be able to assist countries threatened by Communist subversion internally.

Senator Baker. Are you speaking of counterinsurgency as it led to Cuba, or as a general capability?

Mr. Bundy. There was a separate committee, the Special Committee on CI, counterinsurgency. And the Attorney General was an active member of that. And I used to see him playing this very important role of poking and prodding, and why can't you do more, and why can't you do better, and why aren't we

making more progress.

Senator Baker. Who was on that committee?

Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I can't decide from recollection. General Taylor was again the Chairman, but the membership was different.

Senator Baker. Do you have minutes or records of that group?

Mr. Schwarz. No.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that with Mr. Bundy's assistance after this hearing that we identify as much as we can what that group is, and make a fomral request for documentation.

Mr. Aaron. We have reviewed some of that material at the John F. Kennedy Library. It is essentially in fact the group that reviewed paramilitary operations and potential insurgency situations in a number of countries. There was an insurgency list. It did not seem to relate to the subject we are speaking of here. So we did not request the documents. But we could have gotten them.

Senator Baker. Will you do that, please?

Is that agreeable, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. What is your request?

Senator Baker. I would like documentation or any records relating to the counterinsurgency group during the period in question.

The Chairman. Let me suggest that we designate a member of the committee staff to undertake that review, and report back to the committee.

Would that be satisfactory?

Senator Baker. That is fine. I just want to know if there is any worthwhile documentation.

The Chairman. Yes. Because it may be entirely ancillary to this issue.

Senator Baker. Let me ask Mr. Bundy this. Would that group have been important toward American policy during this period?

Mr. Bundy. The CI Group?

Senator Baker. Yes.

Mr. Bundy. I would think only most marginally, Senator Baker, simply because the existence of other groups, the Special Group Augmented or the MONGOOSE Group, was so clearly dominant and was the Central Committee for that subject.

Senator Baker. The gingerbread man concept?

Mr. Bundy. The gingerman concept.

Senator Baker. The gingerman concept. There is a difference.

Do I directly infer from that description that the President would authorize Robert Kennedy to urge and expedite action to move from assignment to assignment and to push people

along to produce a result?

Mr. Bundy. In a general way that is right. But the form it took in the areas in which I was concerned was in one sense quite informal. I know of no instance where the Attorney General tried to replace the normal channel -- let's stay away for the moment from the covert question and the Cuban question, which I know you will want to talk about more precisely -- but if he felt, as he often did, that American policy in Africa, for example, was insufficiently sensitive to the aspirations of black people in Africa, he wouldn't fire off a kick, he would come in and say, why can't you people do something about the State Department on news and stuff.

Senator Baker. There is some evidence -- we had direct testimony that Mr. Helms, who was DDP at the time in question, rather than DCI, clearly thought that the authority of the Agency was to overthrow the Castro regime by any means, including assassination.

And when pressed on the source of that authority he designed to say that anyone specifically told him that, but that he talked to Robert Kennedy frequently about it. Would this be in the gingerman concept you are speaking of?

Mr. Bundy. Now we are right at the specific point I would like to make. But everything I knew about Bobby Kennedy when he was goading and spurring people on is that he never took away from the existing channel of authority its authority

or responsibility.

Senator Baker. Would what I describe be consistent with whatyou describe?

Mr. Bundy. Not if it is interpreted as meaning that he was providing a separate channel of authority.

Senator Baker. What I meant was just what it was, and that is, Helms described for us meeting with Kennedy apparently to stimulate the Agency's activities to produce the overthrow of the Castro regime, and that he met regularly with Kennedy in this respect.

Mr. Bundy. I don't know how often they met or what was said, I know nothing about that. I would have said, just in passing, that the Attorney General's relationship to the Director of Central Intelligence was much closer and more important than his relationship to Mr. Helms.

Senator Baker. I am correct, am I, that Helms at the time was DDP and not DCI?

Mr. Schwarz. That is right.

Senator Baker. Do you have any idea why he would have met regularly with the DDP rather than the DCI?

Mr. Bundy. I have no idea that he did. I know that he met often and intimately and easily with the Director of Central Intelligence, who was a close personal friend of his.

Senator Baker. You are speaking of Mr. McCone?

Mr. Bundy. Mr. McCone.

The Chairman. I think that since the point is important, that when the Committee Staff complete its review of the evidence it ought to be reminded to look closely at that Helms testimony and identify exactly what words Helms might have used to describe his relationship with Robert Kennedy.

Senator Baker. And the time involved and what position Helms occupied at the time.

The Chairman. I have another question.

Mr. Bundy, we also have it from Mr. Bissell that at one time he called in an officer, a subordinate, O'Donnell, -- that at one time Mr. Bissell called in a subordinate whose name was Mr. O'Donnell, and asked Mr. O'Donnell if he would be willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba.

Mr. O'Connell testifies that he said he would not be willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, because he had moral compunctions against killing.

Mr. O'Donnell further testifies that he was then or thereafter dispatched to the Congo, where he was informed that some poison had been made available -- had come to the CIA headquarters in the Congo.

Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I missed that last.

The Chairman. He was informed that some poison had arrived at the CIA headquarters in the Congo.

When we asked Mr. Bissell on what authority he had asked O'Connell as to his willingness to undertake the assassination

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of Lumumba, he could not provide us with that authority, except to say that he may have done it on his own initiative.

Do you have any reaction to that?

Mr. Bundy. Where is it in time?

Senator Church. It was in the fall of 1960. It was not during the Kennedy Administration, it preceded the Kennedy Administration. But I asked you the question, because it strikes me as being a very disturbing piece of testimony, that any man so positioned, in the CIA could not identify higher authority for such an action, and would under oath say that it might have been on his own initiative.

Mr. Bundy. I can't add to your comment on that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Very well.

Senator Morgan. Let me ask him a question or two, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Morgan?

Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you recall very vividly talking with the President on many occasions about Cuba, is that right?

Mr. Bundy. I recall vividly that I talked to him on many occasions, I am not very good on remembering specific discussions.

Senator Morgan. You told us a few minutes ago that he was constantly prodding, and why don't you do this, and why doesn't

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so and so work?

Mr. Bundy. If I may correct that, I said he prodded me from time to time, not all the time.

Senator Morgan. Quite frequently?

Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't put it that often. It might have been three or four times.

Senator MOrgan. Mr. Bundy, you were head of the Security Council, you were his assistant?

Mr. Bundy. I am trying to give an accurate picture of the number of times, Senator.

Senator Morgan. You are trying to give such an accurate picture that you are not giving much of a picture at all.

Are you telling this committee that throughout the time you assumed your duties, throughout the Cuban crisis, and all the MONGOOSE operations, that you might have talked to him two or three times about it?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Could I separate and try and clarify my answer?

Senator Morgan. Yes.

Mr. Bundy. I talked to the President, I suppose, many, many times in the context of the events that led up to and followed the Bay of Pigs. I talked to him dozens of times, maybe even hundreds of times, in the context of the events that led up to and followed the Cuban missile crisis. Those are the two great moments of Presidential concern over Cuba during the

time I was in Washington. I talked to him much less -- I can't give you a number-- on these intervening matters. And that is the distinction I am trying to make.

Senator MOrgan. You were something between himself and the National Security Council, were you not?

Mr. Bundy. That isn't exactly the way it works.

Senator Morgan. Just tell me what did you do.

Mr. Bundy. I am trying to.

Senator Morgan. I have been listening all morning, Mr. Bundy, and I just don't get it.

Let me go to one other question. Was it true a while ago when you said that Robert Kennedy was constantly prodding people? Why can't we do more?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, that is certainly true.

Senator Morgan. I have no other questions.

Senator Mondale. Could I ask one, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. I don't like to ask this question, but I think it is important.

Have you talked to others involved during this period when you may have been testifying before us and before the Rockefeller Commission, say, in the last five months about this testimony?

Mr. Bundy. I answered that question. Yes, I have.

Senator Mondale. Would you repeat it briefly for us?

Mr. Smothers. I was about to pursue that line, Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Go ahead.

Mr. Smothers. I believe you indicated previously, Mr. Bundy, that you talked to Mr. Bissell, Mr. McNamara, Mr. McCone, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Schleinger, and others that may not be on that list. And you indicated that you had spoken to Mr. Bissell after his testimony regarding executive action.

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. Smothers. Had you spoken with him also before that testimony?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Smothers. Did he call you or did you call him?

Mr. Bundy. I don't honestly recall. I think I said the other day that he had called me, but I think actually what happened that he called me, and my first words were, I needed to call you.

Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversations with Mr. McNamara. When did you first talk with him about these matters being testified to?

Mr. Bundy. I think pretty much as soon as it hit the papers.

Mr. Smothers. Can you give the Committee the sense of your conversations with Mr. McNamara?

Mr. Bundy. There have been a number of them. Mr. McNamara and I not only have been close friends, but are very

closely associated now. So, I see him and talk with him frequently, both about substance of matters of international development, and about the business of the Ford Foundation.

So, I have talked to him a number of times both on the telephone and face to face. The essence of the conversation is the exploration of questions raised or doubts raised babout the conviction we both share, which is that no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House, or in the Capitol, ever gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA.

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Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss with him, or did he raise with you specifically, the fact that he had received from Mr. McCone a memorandum from Mr. McCone in 1967?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, he told me that.

Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the substance of that memorandum?

Mr. Bundy. I discussed it initially with Mr. McCone.

Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss it with Mr. McNamara?

Mr. Bundy. He mentioned it to me. I don't recall much about it.

Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the meeting of August 10 in Secretary Rusk's office?

Mr. Bundy. That was the first discussed because the newspapers said that there had been a meeting of three, four or five of us, and the question was whether there had been such a meeting limited to three, four, or five. And we were able to satisfy ourselves that that was wrong.

Mr. Smothers. That was wrong. What do you recall to have been Mr. McNamara's reaction of the August 10 meeting?

Mr. Bundy. He didn't seem to have any that I can recall, at least I don't recall that he told me of any reaction of it.

Mr. Smothers. Do you recall the substance of his comment regarding the 1967 McCone report?

Mr. Bundy. No. I don't think he commented on it. He

told me what it said.

Mr. Smothers. With regard to your conversation with Mr. McCone, when did this occur, approximately?

Mr. Bundy. That occurred earlier on.

Mr. Smothers. Before the Rockefeller Commission inquiry?

Mr. Bundy. I don't know exactly when it was. But it was within the context of the Rockefeller Commission inquiry and not this inquiry.

Mr. Smothers. Are you talking about more than one conversation?

Mr. Bundy. No, I think I talked to him on the phone and then I had a meeting with him.

Mr. Smothers. In either the phone conversation or the meeting did you discuss Mr. McCone's 1967 report?

Mr. Bundy. He told me that he had heard of it. I don't think he had then seen it.

Mr. Smothers. You don't think he had then seen it?

Mr. Bundy. He had then seen it as of 1975. He obviously saw it in 1967.

Mr. Smothers. Can you give us a feeling for the approximate time when this conversation occurred?

Mr. Bundy. I could probably work it out from my own calendar, but I don't have it in my head.

Mr. Smothers. But at this time he had not seen the report?

Mr. Bundy. He had not seen the report in 1975. But since it is a report that -- as I understand it, it is a report that he made in 1967, and he had seen it then.

Mr. Smothers. Did he indicate to you that he was making an effort to get that report?

Mr. Bundy. I think he told me that he had been in touch with the Agency and would be seeing the report, but I don't really recall.

Mr. Smothers. To go into your conversation with Mr. Rostow, would you indicate to the Committee, please, the substance of that conversation?

Mr. Bundy. Yes. I called him after my conversation with Mr. Bissell, because it seemed to me that he ought to be informed, and the two of them ought to talke with each other about that testimony.

Mr. Smothers. At the time you called him it was your impression that Mr. Bissell had not talked with Mr. Rostow?

Mr. Bundy. But was planning to.

Mr. Smothers. And this was after Mr. Bissell's testimony?

Mr. Bundy. That if right.

Mr. Smothers. Did you and Mr. Rostow discuss the fact that both you and Mr. Rostow had been named as potential sources for the Exective Action authorization?

Mr. Bundy. My emphasis in talking about Mr. Rostow was

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the fact that he had been mentioned, because it seemed to me that in my recollection that must be wrong, and he would be interested in getting it straightened out.

Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversation with Mr. Goodwin. Did you call him or did he call you?

Mr. Bundy. I called him.

Mr. Smothers. And the nature of that conversation?

Mr. Bundy. That conversation was about the Dominican Republic, because of my complete failure of recollection as to who or what the White House line of action,responsibility and concern was with respect to the Dominican Republic in 1961. And I called him, and I called Dungan, and I called Schlesinger, because they were the the who had been very much involved in things like the Alliance for Progress, and new appointments to embassies in Latin America, and Latin American Policy generally, except for the Bay of Pigs. And I wanted to see if they had recollections about events in that spring that were more extensive than mine. I didn't learn very much, but that was the purpose of the call.

Mr. Smothers. And it it your testimony that your first exposure to the documentary evidence beyond these recollections was when either the Rockefeller Commission staff or this staff showed you documents pertaining to this inquiry.

Mr. Bundy. I want to be precise about the Rockefeller Commission staff. They did not show me the documents, the

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White House Staff showed me the documents.

Mr. Smothers. The White House Staff showed you the documents?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Under what circumstance did the White House Staff provide these documents to you? Was it at your request, or their request?

Mr. Bundy. My request.

Mr. Smothers. When did it occur?

Mr. Bundy. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings.

Mr. Smothers. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. And prior to your testimony?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Who provided these documents to you?

Mr. Bundy. I never have testified on -- this is not a serious matter, because there is no secret about it. But I have always taken the position that White House decisions are for the White House to discuss, and I perfer to hold to that position now.

Mr. Smothers. Are you saying that you do not feel at liberty --

Mr. Bundy. No, I am not saying, I am saying that I would request the committee to address that question with the White House.

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The Chairman. What is the question?

Mr. Smothers. The question is who in the White House provided Mr. Bundy with documents relevant to this investigation. And I believe his position is that he would prefer not to disclose that matter, or that that is a matter for the Committee's determination.

Mr. Bundy. Let me explain, Mr. Chairman, because you were out of the room, that I have always taken the position that decisions of the White House are for the White House to discuss. I always asked permission to see documentation and permission was given. I looked at the document, but I would rather not discuss it, because I think it is for the White House to discuss it.

The Chairman. What is the document?

Mr. Bundy. I just described it, it is National Security Action Memorandum No. 1, we showed us the National Security Action file, which I believe your staff has.

Mr. Schwarz. We have it here.

Mr. Smothers. My question was, who had the request been made to, and showed him the document?

Mr. Bundy. My point is that I have tried historically not to discuss this kind of question when it is something that concerns the White House, but to leave it to the White House to discuss it, and I would prefer to hold to that position.

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(Off the record.)

Mr. Smothers. This quite frankly, Mr. Bundy, this related to an ancillary matter that is of concern to the Committee.

You mentioned conversations with Mr. Schlesinger. Again, were those initiated by you?

Mr. Bundy. The most recent one, he called me. And I think there were earlier ones, but I don't know. I can't be precise. I must say I don't know that I understand the line of questioning. These are very important matters, and people closely involved in them should be trying to get a clear sense of what each other remembers after this many years, it seems to me this would be entirely natural.

Mr. Smothers. I don't question the fact that it is natural, Mr. Bundy. I think one of the difficult things for this Committee to do is to separate out, if you will, the independent recollections from the documentary evidence we have shown you, and from conversations with others --

Mr. Bundy. You are quite right. And I have tried quite carefully to tell you my recollection.

Mr. Smothers. We are merely trying now to establish those relationships so that when we get the point in the record there is some question regarding the nature of the recollection that might be of some assistance to us. That is not an attack on your veracity, it is not an attempt to

see if there has been any effort at collusion or whatever, but merely to give us some guidelines in looking at the record.

Do you recall, Mr. Bundy, from these conversations that we have just mentioned, any matters which have been raised by the participants that may be inconsistent with the documentary record as you have seen it? We know, of course, that Mr. McNamara's recollection appears to be inconsistent with the documentary evidence regarding the August 10 meeting.

Mr. Bundy. Well, so was mine. And I have no such recollection.

Mr. Smothers. I am speaking now of the recollection of others, if you will.

Mr. Bundy. I can't really recite on that, because I haven't made the kind of comparison document by document and conversation by conversation that would allow me to make a clearcut and comprehensive answer. But I don't have any recollection of sharp divergency of that sort.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to pick up on one thing that you testified to that was left hanging and then come back through your involvement with Cuba and starting from the beginning. You testified that to your knowledge no authorization for an assassination was given. I want to

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come at the subject from another direction. Were you ever told at any time by anybody that assassination efforts were actually under way with respect to Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that the Central Intelligence Agency had hired the Mafia to assassinate Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that during the MONGOOSE program Mr. Harvey was engaged in assassination efforts upon Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in the fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was passing assassination devices to a Cuban military officer?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in the fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in an assassination effort with respect to Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, after the Bay of Pigs, was there a reevaluation or reconsideration of what the policy toward Cuba should be? And would you turn in that connection to Tab B, of the Bundy Book 1 of 2 --

Senator Tower. May I raise a purely technical point. I

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know it is not intentional, but I think we use the term, the Mafia was hired to assassinate Castro, I think that was inaccurate, because I don't think we have anything that indicates that we contacted the syndicate as such, and I think if we use, "individuals likely associated with the Mafia," or something like that -- it is a little technical.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me restate the question to make sure that there is not a problem with the scope of my question. And Senator Tower is correct.

Were you ever told that the Agency had contacted a man called John Roselli?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. A man called Sam Giancana?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. A man called Santos Traficante?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Any person who was a criminal or allegedly a criminal for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection whatsoever related to the subject we have been exploring in that group of questions?

Mr. Bundy. No -- you are familiar with the fact that -- refreshed my recollection of activities associated with the Mafia in a law enforcement context in Florida in 1964.

Mr. Schwarz. Since you raised it, let's just pin that down right now. What happened in 1964 with respect to the Mavia and Cuba, to the best or your recollection? And then we will just mark some documents.

Mr. Bundy. Let me be clear that my recollection here is entirely refreshed. Perhaps you would rather come back to it?

Mr. Schwarz. Let's put it in the record here, since we have raised the subject.

Let's mark as Bundy Exhibit 1 the Helms memo to DCA on the Cuban exile plan dated June 10, 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 2A, the minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee dated June 22, 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2A for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 2B the minutes of the 303 Committee of 18 June 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2B for identification.)



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Mr. Schwarz. And Bundy Exhibit 2C the minutes of the 303 Committee of July 31, 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2C for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. And as Bundy Exhibit 2D the memorandum for the Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, "Status of FBI Investigation re Plans by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders," dated August 19, 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2D for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, based upon your having had an opportunity prior to the testimony, and now again if you seek to do so, to refresh your recollection, will you recount for the Committee what happened in the summer of 1964 in connection with this matter?

Mr. Bundy. Well, it is a relatively small matter in the context of what you are discussing, but what happened in the summer of 1964 was that it came to our attention that there were relations between Cuban refugees in Cuba and people apparently associated with the Mafia. And this did not seem to be a good idea. And this was in a period in which sentiment had been steadily growing for some time against activities by Cuban refugees that were wholly outside the control and not really in the interest of the U.S., and that they should be associated with a criminal group.

And so when the matter came to the Special Group, the decision was made to refer it to the Department of Justice as a matter of internal American law enforcement. That was done.

And the Department said that it was going after the matter, which it then did, and reported back.

The reports don't give any conclusive picture of what really was going on, but they do show that the Bureau went to a number of people asking around about these matters, and as far as I know, it then faded away.

Mr. Schwarz. In the context of that discussion did anybody from the Central Intelligence Agency or anybody else inform you that in earlier years there had been a relationship with -- to use Senator Tower's caution -- with persons alledgedly involved with the criminal syndicate -- in order to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castor?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, going back to the post-Bay of Pigs period, would you put before the witness and mark as Exhibit 2 the National Security minutes of a meeting held May 5, 1961. It is at Tab B of the Senator's Book 1 of 2. This reflects, am I correct, Mr. Bundy, a discussion of Cuba, held with the President and high officials of the government who are all listed on the front page?

Mr. Bundy. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And Cuba was discussed, and it was agreed, following the discussion that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action?

Mr. Bundy. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, can you describe the measures agreed to at that point?

Mr. Bundy. My only way of doing that with any accuracy

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is to in effect to quote from or summarize this document, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. The document speaks for itself, then. And you can add nothing to it?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. But can you say that the measures did or did not include assassination?

Mr. Bundy. There is nothing in my recollection and nothing in the document that seems to me to imply assassination.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, following this instruction, was Cuban policy reviewed again in the fall of 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And ultimately out of the fall review in 1961 came the so-called MONGOOSE program; is that correct?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, prior to discussing upon the MONGOOSE program, did you consider a lot of other options?

Mr. Bundy. I think we were -- and this is a hard question, but I think what we were doing was working toward an organization that would be able to take charge of the complicated, varied inter-departmental kinds of things involved in Cuba. We have been concentrating this morning on covert actions, but there were also propaganda problems, economic problems, and Cuban refugee problems in Miami, and a number

of others that did not all fall within one jurisdiction. Anytime you get that kind of problem you have an organization problem. And the solution of 1961, which took sometime to work out, as the passage of time suggests, was the creation of a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of General Taylor and with General Lansdale as its operating officer.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in the course of the review that did take place prior to the establishment of that Special Committee which then got called the MONGOOSE program, was one of the matters which was considered the assassination of Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. As I have already said, I can not tell you that this question never came up. But I recall no sustained discussion of that matter in that period.

Mr. Schwarz. Whether you recall a sustained discussion or not --

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall a discussion that I can pinpoint anywhere, but over the period of 1961 to 1963 the subject was mentioned from time to time by different individuals, never to me that I can recall by the President. But it did come up.

Mr. Schwarz. And it may have come up in this period in the fall of 1961 as something to consider, is that correct?

Mr. Bundy. As something to talk about rather than to consider, would be my answer.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you put before the witness as Bundy

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Exhibit 3 the National Security Action Memorandum No. 100, dated October 5, 1961, Tab C of the Senator's Bundy Book 1.

And as Bundy Exhibit 3A the minutes of the Special Group meeting dated October 6, 1961, which is at Lansdale Tab 2.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 3A for identification.

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Mr. Schwarz. Would you give a copy of the other document, the Parrott document, to all the Senators too?

And finally, as Bundy Exhibit 3B a memorandum which we have retyped from an indistinct original dated October 5, 1961 For the Record, Subject: Cuba, signed by Mr. Parrott. And the indistinct original is attached.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 3B for identification)



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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, to summarize -- before I ask you the question -- in NSAM No. 100 you sent to the Secretary of State the following note: "In conformation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired to the indicated contingency in Cuba". Do you have an independent recollection of what that indicated contingency was?

Mr. Bundy. Before seeing this document?

Mr. Schwarz. Before seeing the documents.

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Having looked at not only Exhibit 3, but Exhibit 3A and 3B, do you agree that the contingency referred to in 3A and the contingency referred to in 3B are related to NSAM No. 100?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I do.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency referred to in 3B, which is the earlier of the two following documents, is said by Mr. Parrott to be a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scent. And I am going to come to some of the other parts of that document with respect to the President's interest or not.

And the contingency in 3A, which is the minutes of the Special Group, as characterized as follows: "Mr. Parrott also told the Group that two other exercises are in progress in

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connection with Cuba, the preparation of a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene, and an updating of the overall plan for covert operations".

Now, after having reviewed those documents, and in the light of your testimony that it is possible that the consideration of the possibility of assassination which you say did occur at some point, occurred in the fall of 1961, do you agree that at that time the contingency under consideration here was the possibility of the assassination of Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No, I would put it another way. The contingency here is, what would we do if Castro were no longer there. So that the question of how Castro ceased to be there is left out of this set of papers. Clearly one of the possibilities would be assassination, but only one of them. What we are talking about here, as I read the documents, is a plan against the contingency that I am not reading from the Parrott memorandum, against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene. NSAM 100, whose language is indirect, nonetheless indicates, to me at least, rereading it, that the President wanted to know what was likely to happen if Castro were no longer there. He was, in other words, trying to get a picture of whether that would really change things, and if so, in what way.

Mr. Schwarz. Just one detail that Mr. Smothers suggested to me. Is NSAM 100 what the White House showed you, or is it another document?

Mr. Bundy. No, 181. But let me be precise. I asked to see the documents relating to -- from the National Security files relating to August 1962. And they gave me the NSAM file identified as the significant memorandum, NSAM 181.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency to be examined, therefore, was what would happen -- would it help the U.S., that is the question, if Castro were to disappear?

Mr. Bundy. What would it be like if Castro were to disappear? The question is open ended.

Mr. Schwarz. What was the conclusion?

Mr. Bundy. I don't remember. My unaided sense of the matter is that intelligent political analysis would have suggested in 1961 or at any time later that the removal of a single individual in a revolution complex and general as this would have quite unpredictable and not necessarily helpful effects.

Mr. Schwarz. You said that while you were clear the assassination was not in fact authorized, you believe that at some point it was examined, is that a fair characterization.

Mr. Bundy. That isn't the word I used. Talk about.

Mr. Schwarz. Talk about. And this exercise constitutes an analysis of what Cuba/the U.S. would be like if Castro were

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removed.

Mr. Bundy. It constitutes a request for such an analysis.

Mr. Schwarz. Was the analysis made?

Mr. Bundy. I don't have any recollection.

Mr. Schwarz. If one were exploring the possibility of assassination, I take it this kind of analysis is the sort of analysis one would wish to make if one was not simply ruling assassination out as a matter of principle in the first instance.

Mr. Bundy. Let me put it another way. If people were suggesting this to you, and you were curious about whether it was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it without going any further with that notion itself would be to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer.

You will notice that this National Security Action Memorandum is not addressed to the Central Intelligence Agency, less still to the covert part of the Agency, but rather to the Secretary of State. And specifically clearly the action of certain is Assistant Secretary Woodward.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, document 3B indicates -- and you have had an opportunity to review this one before, I think --

Mr. Bundy. Which one are we now talking about?

Mr. Schwarz. 3B, Mr. Parrott's memo.

Mr. Bundy. Yes. I have a clearer copy now than I had

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yesterday, for which I am grateful.

Mr. Schwarz. It indicates that there was a Presidential interest in the matter. And then General Taylor told Mr. Parrott that he prefered that the State Department, or Mr. Woodward in the State Department, not be told about the Presidential interest in the matter. First, was there a Presidential interest in the matter? You have no reason to doubt that there was, I take it.

Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I was reading a note, and I didn't hear the last part of the question.

Mr. Schwarz. I asked really two questions, the first of which is a direct question, was there a Presidential interest in the matter?

Mr. Bundy. There was a Presidential -- there was no doubt in my mind that when I write in a National Security Action Memorandum a plan as desired, that the desire is not mine.

Mr. Schwarz. And the desire is in fact the Presidents?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, have you any other recollection of calling your attention to the fall of 1969?

Mr. Bundy. Could I go back and comment on your earlier question.

You correctly pointed out that there was concern to keep the President's name out of this process of request,

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although you correctly point out that the President was the one who wanted to know. My impression here is that whatever concern we have, General Taylor or I, in the frame of this language, it was precisely to insulate the President from any false inference that what he was asking about was assassination. It is easy to confuse the question. What are things going to be like after Castro, with the other question, and we were trying to focus attention on the information he obviously wanted, which is, what would happen if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it. That is the distinction, I think.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any further recollection of discussion of this matter in this fall of 1961? And by this matter I mean either the broader inquiry into what it would be like if Castro disappeared, or a scenario arising of the specific subject of assassination.

Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.

Mr. Schwarz. Had you ever heard before I asked you about the last night about a conversation, an alledged conversation, between the President and the Journalist Theodore Schwartz, and or Mr. Goodwin in this timeframe?

Mr. Bundy? I saw that in the newspapers.

Mr. Schwarz. Or in Esquire magazine?

Mr. Bundy. Wherever I saw it, I saw it in print.

Mr. Schwarz. But you have no independent recollection of that or of the fact that Mr. Schultz met with the President?

Mr. Bundy. No. But I will say this -- and it is a random observation -- if I were planning an action of great sensitivity I wouldn't discuss it with any journalist, I don't think.

Mr. Schwarz. The record from Mr. Schwartz is that the President said he was opposed to assassination, but that he brought it up in a conversation with Mr. Schwartz, saying that he was being encouraged to order assassination.

Now, you have said that you do recall that the subject was talked about, your words, at some point, and that it might have been in the fall of 1961.

Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't want to say that it was only in any given period.

Mr. Schwarz. But that one of the points in which it might have been discussed was the fall of 1961.

Mr. Bundy. Certainly.

Mr. Schwarz. We are going to come to another period which relates to you.

Mr. Bundy. May I interrupt one second.

Could we go off the record for a moment?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Let's put that on the record.

Would you restate what I have just stated?

Mr. Bundy. Going back to your earlier question, I have a message through the courtesy of the Committee from the White House that there is no objection to answering the question as to how the White House came to show me the NSC file. When I learned of some of the interests of the Rockefeller Commission, it seemed to me that it would be useful if I could refresh my recollection. I telephoned Dr. Kissinger, who it seemed to me would be the right person both in his capacity as Special Assistant and the capacity as Secretary of State, and he called me back to say that General Scocroft would show me the documents I needed, and he did not.

Mr. Smothers. Just one question.

This file contained what, now, other than the NSAM?

Mr. Bundy. The only file that I had time to go through that I can recollect was the NSAM file, which is a relatively short one.

Mr. Smothers. For which time period?

Mr. Bundy. For the period surrounding August 1962.

Mr. Smothers. It was given to us as an existing file, or matters that had been pulled, or organized --

Mr. Bundy. No, they gave me the whole file, they were all documents that I have been involved with, it was nothing new to me. But the ones I was looking for were the ones relating to this subject.

Mr. Smothers. Were these only your documents?

Mr. Bundy. As far as I recollect.

Mr. Smothers. And by your documents, I mean documents signed by you?

Mr. Bundy. They wouldn't be all signed by me, not every NSMA was signed by me. But they would all be documents for which I had responsibility.

Mr. Smothers. And the timeframe was --

Mr. Bundy. Sufficiently before and after to give me a picture of the political context of August 1962 in relation to Cuba.

Mr. Smothers. And do you recall when you saw this file?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I say, it was in the context of my appearance before the Rockeferrer Commission. And that would be early this year. I don't have the dates, and I don't want to make a mistake on it.

Mr. Smothers. I am not trying to pin the date down. It would be helpful if you remember. But we can ask.

Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to make sure that we have what we have done so for accurately summarized, and that you agree with it.

Can I use discussion of an assassination, will you accept that?

Mr. Bundy. It implies more seriousness and more sustained argument than I recollect.

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Mr. Schwarz. So your records are, with respect to persons asking about --

Mr. Bundy. Or talking about.

Mr. Schwarz. -- or talking about assassination, that did occur, that it probably occurred on more than one occasion?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And that one of the occasions may have been in the fall of 1961?

Mr. Bundy. What I recollect about the fall of 1961 is this question, what would happen if he is not there?

Mr. Schwarz. Which would be a relevant question to ask if one was talking about assassination.

Mr. Bundy. Yes. But I have no independent recollection of talks about assassination, Mr. Schwarz, and I musn't lead you by saying that I did.

Mr. Schwarz. In any event, passing from talking about or discussions or contingencies, to authorizations for action, and specifically focusing on this concrete period, was assassination authorized in the fall of 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.

Mr. Schwarz. In fact what was authorized in the fall of 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Well, we have a long document on that, I think.

Mr. Schwarz. And that is the MONGOOSE program?

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Mr. Bundy. And that is the MONGOOSE programs.

Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the MONGOOSE program, you had some dialogue about the Attorney General which was quite extensive. Let me ask you one additional question on that subject. What was the relationship personally and professionally between the Attorney General and General Maxwell Taylor?

Mr. Bundy. It was very close. I think that they first met in a hardworking sense when they were -- I think they were both members of the committee to look into what happened after the Bay of Pigs, or if the Attorney General was not a member he was certainly closely interested.

Mr. Schwarz. He was a member.

Mr. Bundy. And I am sure the Attorney General was one of the people strongly favoring the appointment of General Taylor as the President's military advisor. They were both active and ardent tennis players, they liked each other, and they visited back and forth. One of the Kennedy children is named for General Taylor, I think. There was a relation of real trust and confidence between them. And the measure of its strength is that I think it easily survived later very shart differences over Vietnam.

Mr. Schwarz. Now recognizing that, what I am asking for you is a matter of opinion and not a fact, given your understanding of that relationship, will you give us your opinion

the likelihood that Robert Kennedy, in the face of Maxwell Taylor's Chairmanship of the Special Group Augmented -- was Maxwell Taylor understood to be the Chairman of the Special Group Augmented?

Mr. Bundy. It certainly is my understanding.

Mr. Schwarz. Would Robert Kennedy in your opinion, in the fact of Maxwell Taylor's Chairmanship of the Special Group Augmented, have developed a bach-channel relationship with someone else for the purpose of assassinating Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in connection with MONGOOSE, you were a member of the Special Group Augmented, were you?

Mr. Bundy. I was. I wasn't its most faithful attender, but I was a member.

Mr. Schwarz. To the extent that you did attend, would you describe the nature of the meetings, what kind of items were brought before you, what was the process for decision making?

Mr. Bundy. It is very difficult to do that without documentary reconstruction. But in the broadest sense, I think I can do it. The kinds of things would be Cuban exiles, training them, how united are they, whose the leader, and what kind of operations against the island are we able to mount, specific proposals, just because I have seen it in

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the last two or three days -- I saw a sabotage program which involved, I think, oil facilities, tranrportation facilities, and a couple of other categories -- exfiltration was a frequent problem. I don't recall that we worried so much about getting the agents in, but there seems always to be a great problem about getting them out. And that sort of thing that I mentioned, propaganda, there was the one island enterprise -- was Florida doing much good, and how much does it cost and things of that sort.

Mr. Schwarz. At any MONGOOSE meeting did Mr. Harvey state that he had taken steps to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I never heard anything from Mr. Harvey in any context in any meeting at any time on that subject.

Mr. Schwarz. And it was clear that the President was the person basically in control, perhaps not of the details, but of the general program; is that right?

Mr. Bundy. The President had worked it. The day to day operations where in the hands of different departments for different categories of programs. The coordinator was General Lansdale, and the Chairman of the Committee was General Taylor.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you turn to Lansdale Tab 38, please?

Where is the August 8 document that transmits the new guidelines for MONGOOSE?

Mr. Kelley. That is Lansdale Tab 20.

Mr. Schwarz. The new guidelines, I mean the August guidelines.

Mr. Kelley. 38.

Mr. Schwarz. 38A.

Was there a change in or about August between what was characterized as Phase I of Operation MONGOOSE and a step-up activities under the MONGOOSE?

Mr. Bundy. It appeared to be so from the documents I have been reviewing. I couldn't give you an independent recollection on that point.

Mr. Schwarz. You have got no reason to doubt that there was some step-up commencing in August?

Mr. Bundy. I think that sounds reasonable. I just don't have any expertise other than as a reader many years later.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, with respect to the August 10 meeting, you have previously testified - - I am not sure you have -- do you recall the subject of assassinations being brought up?

Mr. Bundy. In the August 10 meeting? No.

Mr. Schwarz. Specifically, do you recall Mr. McNamara ever bringing the subject of assassinations up?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. We have shown you notes of Mr. Harvey on August 14, and General Lansdale's memorandum of August 13 that refers to the liquidation of leaders and certain things

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whited out. Do you remember seeing those?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Do they refresh your recollection?

Mr. Bundy. No. They give me no -- they do not persuade me. I simply don't from that suddenly have any flash, so and so said that, not at all.

Mr. Schwarz. But you don't have any reason to question them, you just don't have a recollection, is that fair?

Mr. Bundy. I simply tell you that I was in a large meeting in which a great many subjects were discussed, and I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Schwarz. I will pass around Mr. Bundy's notes from the meeting. If someone thinks they should be marked we can do that.

Mr. Bundy. If the Committee is feeling charitable I hope they may not go into them.

Mr. Schwarz. I don't think they will, but I thought we would pass them around in case they were.

The Chairman. Let the Senators see them.

Mr. Schwarz. We will make one observation, though. Both Mr. Rusk's calendar and Mr. Bundy's notes do not indicate Mr. Lansdale's being present at the meeting, although the minutes of the meeting do. And I take it you have no independent recollection of whether or not he was not there.

Mr. Bundy. I have no objection to entering anything in


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anything that memorandum that the Committee thinks is relevant. It simply illustrates what the hand will do while the mind is elsewhere.

The Chairman. Can you identify what you meant by the words, "Worms who were opposing".

Mr. Bundy. "Worms" was a Cuban word, gusanos, and it was their own word for themselves, Cubans in opposition to Castor.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, would you mark with a B your notes of the August 10 meeting.

And Mr. Reporter, will you mark that as Bundy Exhibit 4.

(Document referred to was marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)



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The Chairman. Going back to the doodle sheet, the last item in your handwritten underlined -- do you have this?

Mr. Bundy. The Lansdale concept?

The Chairman. Is that concept?

Mr. Bundy. Concept. I don't wonder you ask.

The Chairman. Do you recall what you meant by that?

Mr. Bundy. My guess -- and this is a reconstruction really -- is that that has to do with the Lansdale plan which we were referring to a minute ago, his long memorandum of August 8, outlining all the things that might now be done under the MONGOOSE.

Mr. Smothers. Would that have been planned plus?

Mr. Bundy. We argue about plans -- this is again reconstruction -- and I think I saw it in some discussion -- we argued about plans A and B and C, and settled on so-called B Plus, which I hope you have for the record, because that would show what the decision was.

Mr. Schwarz. We do have it.

The Chairman. This was the 10th day of August 1962. And that was about the time that some concern was given to be expressed as to the possibility that the Russians were moving into Cuba -- moving missiles into Cuba. You have on the memorandum, I think, "USSR will put missiles". Do you recall what you meant by that?

Mr. Bundy. I think what that is, a hand following

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somebody elses, and the somebody else would most likely to be Mr. McCone.

The Chairman. All right.

Where are we, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. In NSAM 181 -- which will you please mark as Exhibit 5. You will find it at Lansdale Tab 41.

(Document referred to was marked as Lansdale Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. Do you have that in front of you, Mr. Bundy?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.

Mr. Schwarz. This reflects a number of options or study that the President called for in the light of the evidence of new block activities in Cuba. Was that evidence connected with the missiles?

Mr. Bundy. Well, there was quite a buildup reported in the press and in the intelligence initially of Soviet military personnel, of Soviet surface-to-air missiles. And the crucial question was, what for and what is coming. And the Director of Central Intelligence -- who was proved in the end to be right -- was almost alone in his belief that this was going to lead to a nuclear capability in Cuba that could hit the U.S. And he raised these questions in the month of August in a number of different ways. And the National Security meeting from which this memorandum emerged reviewed those problems, and as the memorandum itself shows, the heavy emphasis of the President's concern and of the Group's concern on the likelihood that developed and what should be done about it, or in preparation for it, in August.

Mr. Schwarz. The memorandum has quite a range of matters to be considered. And they range from, if I can use the characterization, on the soft side, Item 1, which was consideration of the U.S. pulling its missiles near the Soviet Union out

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of Turkey, two, on the hard side, Items 7 and 8 , which are military possibilities of invasion or some other military possibilities in connection with Cuba. Now, is that a typical exercise that that White House, the President and yourself would go through to look at a number of options ranging from the soft to the very tough?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Let me say in passing that there was nothing soft about the problem of getting the Jupiter missiles out of Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz. Conciliatory, would that be the word?

Mr. Bundy. It problem of actually getting them out which we came to in the following year was one which demanded great diplomatic energy and finesse on the part of the State and Defense Departments. But you are right. A wide range of issues characticaly would be discussed. And the President had a habit of trying to look at problems from many angles.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you fully in touch with the President in connection with what became the missile crisis.

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Was there any discussion of assassinating Fidel Castro during that period?

Mr. Bundy. None.

Mr. Schwarz. Was there agreement reached that as part of the solution to the missile crisis that related to U.S.



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action vis-a-vis Cuba. There was a so-called no invasion pledge. There was an undertaking on our side that if the offensive capabilities -- and there was an argument on what those were -- were removed, we on our side would undertake -- I don't want to present this language as if it is deeply mathmatically precise -- but there was an undertaking on our side that there would not be an assassination of Cuba.

The Chairman. Was that ever published?

Mr. Bundy. Yes. If my language is inconsistent with what was published, then what was published should take precedence, because I am only trying to report that.

Mr. Schwarz. Did this agreement exclude the sabotage of Cuban facilities?

Mr. Bundy. Not in my view or in anyones' view in the U.S. Government. Just to give you an example of things it did not exclude, it did not exclude continued surveillance, which is not perfectly normal in relations between friendly states, that you overfly and check out what they are doing. But surveillance was an explicit and public part of the necessary concern for U.S. satisfaction with the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. Schwarz. Recognizing again that this is calling for an opinion, during the course of the missile crisis did anything happen with respect to the attitudes and actions of either the President or the Attorney General that in your

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opinion bears upon the likelihood that at other times one or the other of them ordered the assassination of Fidel Castro?

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Mr. Bundy. Well, yes. There are a great many things that enter into my judgment about whether the President or the Attorney General would ever have done that, and I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that the most important point I want to make, just from where I stand personally is that I find the notion that they separately, privately encouraged, ordered, arranged efforts at assassination totally inconsistent with what I knew of both of them. And as an example, I would cite -- and only one among very many -- the role played by the Attorney General in the Missile Crisis, because it was he who, most emphatically, argued against a so-called surgical air strike or any other action that would bring death upon many, in favor of the more careful approach which was eventually adopted by the President in the form of a quarrantine or a blockade.

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Bundy, let me put what may be the same question a little different way.

You came to know both the President and the Attorney General rather intimately in the period of your long association with them, did you not?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred during that whole period, either one of them would have authorized the assassination of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I most emphatically do not.

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Let me make a more general point that comes at it from another way.

If you have heard testimony that there was pressure to do something about Cuba, there was. There was an effort, both from the President in his style and from the Attorney General in his style to keep the government active in looking for ways to weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if you, as I understand it, and not even those who pressed the matter most closely as having essentially been inspired by the White House can tell you that anyone ever said to them, go and kill anyone.

Let me say one other thing about these two men, and that is that there was something that they really wanted done, they did not leave people in doubt, so that on the one hand, I would say about their character, their purposes and their nature and the way they confronted international affairs that I find it incredible that they would have ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly an assassination of Castro. I also feel that if, contrary to everything that I know about their character, they had had such a decision and such a purpose, people would not have been in any doubt about it.

The Chairman. Then have you any way to explain to the Committee, or any explanation to give to the Committee, as to why Mr. Helms would testify that he was under, or that he had no doubts, that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to not only develop schemes, but to engage in active attempts to



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assassinate Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I have no explanation of that.

Senator Mondale. Part of our attempt to solve this riddle of what would appear to be a record at the highest level, which is at least not directly an order of an assassination plot or attempt, and square it with the fact that attempts were made, is to seek to understand the personalities and motivations and methods of operation of people further down the chain of command.

We have heard quite a few evaluations of Mr. Harvey as a free-wheeling, James Bond kind of operator, and it has been suggested through some disquiet and apprehension at higher levels about the nature of his conduct. And I would -- I don't know. I am beginning to have doubts about Mr. Helms whom I have always admired. There is, for example, a memorandum that is in the record to Mr. Rusk in response to a memo which the Secretary wrote Mr. Helms following an article appearing in some Cuban newspaper charging that the Mafia had been hired and used by the CIA to assassinate Castro, in which Helms specifically and categorically denies flat out that any such relationship existed when in fact it did and when in fact Mr. Helms was part of it.

Now, how do we sort this out? Is Mr. Helms someone who might have, on his own, gone beyond the authority conferred upon him by persons higher up?

Mr. Bundy. Well, if you had asked me that question a year ago, Senator, I would have said in my experience with him he was not such an officer, but I have no way of dealing with the kind of thing you have just described.

Senator Mondale. It shatters me because I have always respected him. Because we know that these assassination attempts occurred. We know that Mr. Helms was a part of it. We have testimony that Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey met and agreed not to tell Mr. McCone what they were doing. And then we have a document here -- well, that was Cubella -- and then we have a memo from Helms to Rusk which, in Minnesota language looks like a lie. Now, I just don't know. Maybe there are other explanations.

The Chairman. The memo to Rusk had to do with Cubella rather than the Mafia.

Senator Mondale. Is that it? It was not the Mafia?

Mr. Schwarz. It was Cubella, except if you just substitute Cubella for the word Mafia.

The Chairman. What you said otherwise is correct.

Senator Mondale. But he was involved personally with Cubella, wasn't he? And he knew that, and this memo said no.

Is there a plausible explanation?

Mr. Madigan. Helms has one.

Senator Baker. Helms' position is that he did not lie, that he did not have anything to do with the Cubella incident,

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is that right?

Mr. Madigan. I think Helms claimed that Cubella is in the strict context of the memos, operating on his own.

The Chairman. Well, I believe rather than speculate, we had better look back carefully, and that ought to be another subject for Mr. Helms when he returns.

Senator Mondale. Well, then I will stand corrected.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would you yield?

I want to make the same record note that I suspend the comment I made about that document yesterday. I thought it was a flat-out lie.

Senator Mondale. I did too. I withdraw that, and I think it would be good if the staff would write us a little memo.

Senator Baker. Fritz might like to know that yesterday I asked Counsel if they, as a combined staff operation, would prepare for us, and I believe they agreed to do this, prepare for us two briefs, one citing the testimony and the exhibit evidence, that would support an inference that the authority was Presidential; and another brief, citing the record and the exhibit evidence citing the inference that it was not. There is an abundance of both, to be frank with you. So that we can lay them down side by side and make our own separate judgment.

Do I understand the staff is going to do it?

The Chairman. That is right.

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Now, I have a couple of items of business, and you have been testifying for quite a long while. I think you ought to be given a break, Mr. Bundy.

Mr. Bundy. Do you want me to come back, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, please, if you want to take a break for about five or ten minutes and then be available out in the anteroom, that will give us a chance to take care of this business.

(Pause)

(Whereupon at 11:17 a.m. the witness left the hearing room.)

The Chairman. We seem to have a developing problem for reasons unexplained with the Justice Department. I have already mentioned one aspect of that problem, in connection with the failure of the Department to supply most of the material that we have requested, though that request was put to the Department two months ago, and it has been decided already by the Committee that Mr. Levy and Mr. Kelley should be brought before the Committee in the hopes that these delays can be overcome.

The first question before the Committee is when that can be done. It is suggested that the Attorney General has Tuesday morning available. If it is all right with the Committee, I would like to schedule his appearance, together with that of Mr. Kelley, for Tuesday morning.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to intrude my personal convenience into this consideration unduly, but if the Attorney General could do it at Tuesday noon, say, it would help me. I have a commitment in Tennessee Monday night. If I catch the Tuesday morning plane I can't get here until 11:50.

If that's not possible, I will cancel Monday.

The Chairman. This is procedural in character, so it is not altogether important that every member be present. I think that from the standpoint of this Committee schedule, Tuesday morning, the Attorney General and Mr. Kelley would be good, would it not?

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Mr. Miller. Yes.

Senator Baker. Well, why don't you leave it Tuesday morning.

The Chairman. We are only informed that he has Tuesday morning available.

Mr. Gitenstein. I spoke to Doug Marvin, one of his Executive Assistants, and he said Tuesday was a possibility, Wednesday is a problem because he has a Cabinet meeting and he wasn't sure about Tuesday and he was going to get back to us in the next hour or two.

The Chairman. Well, let's see if we can't set it up Tuesday.

Senator Baker. If you can set it up Tuesday afternoon and nobody objects, that would be better for me.

The Chairman. Well, if we can, we'll set it up Tuesday afternoon.

Senator Mathias. What is that for?

The Chairman. That is for Levy and Kelley to appear for the purpose of telling us why they can't, or why it has taken two months and we still are waiting for the documents, most of the documents we requested.

Senator Mathias. Well, I won't be here, but that's no reason.

Senator Baker. Are you going to be here Tuesday morning?

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Senator Mathias. Don't worry about it.

The Chairman. All right.

The second thing I would like to bring up in this connection is that I was informed yesterday by the staff that the FBI has undoubtedly received instructions that none of its agents are to be interrogated or interviewed by the staff of this Committee. I would like someone who knows the details and can be very specific to tell the Committee the exact status of that situation, how we have been informed and if we can rely on that information as being authoritative.

Mr. Elliff. Yesterday morning at 9:00 o'clock or shortly thereafter, I received a phone call from the FBI's liaison with this Committee with respect to a series of interviews that had been arranged with the Bureau some relating to the Huston Plan, some relating to Martin Luther King matters. I was informed that I had to address this request to the Justice Department in order to secure approval for these staff interviews.

I then called our liaison in the Justice Department, Special Counsel William O'Conner, and he told me I might as well submit these requests in writing, because the Justice Department would take at least ten days to give us an answer on these requests and he didn't know what the answer was going to be.

I then explored with him what some of the reasons might be for this delay and what the problems seemed to be, and the

explanation that he gave me verbally was that the fact that the Committee had notified the Department in its letter of June 27th that certain cases that we were investigating were abuse cases meant that any interviews that would be conducted in connection with those matters would be considered by the Department to be demand interviews, and therefore this brought into play the provisions of the Federal Regulations which require the Attorney General's approval.

Then the question as to whether the Attorney General would approve or not involved two issues. First was that since we had indicated the likelihood of an abuse in a particular area that the Department itself would have to consider whether it should institute a criminal investigation of that matter, and then, if so, whether our interview would interfere with that ongoing criminal investigation.

And second, that the Department considered that any interviews undertaken by the Committee in such cases might inadvertently immunize the subject of the interview, and he referred generally to some cases and we have attempted to do legal research on those cases and find this to be a very shaky position but they have good lawyers over there and if they want to come up with a sophisticated argument, we expect that they could be able to do that.

The Chairman. Lawyers can make an argument over anything.

Mr. Elliff. That's so. And so the final conclusion is



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that he did anticipate that subpoenas would be required in every instance and this position is very difficult for us to accept because interviews, the low-key interview in the non-pressure situation is an opportunity to elicit information that is not matched by the formal subpoena situation, and to be able to proceed initially by interview and then confirm, under oath, via subpoena, is just absolutely essential for an effective investitation. So this is where we stand on this issue.

We later received a letter pertaining to an earlier request for interviews relating to FBI COINTELPRO disruptive activities where we had asked for certain interviews, and this letter did not go into specifics, but merely stated that there were problems that would have to be resolved, that the characterization of an area of the Committee inquiry as abuse might significantly alter arrangements of access to witnesses who are present employees of the Department.

The Chairman. In other words, the thrust of all of this is that the more serious the nature of the inquiry, the more difficult it will be to obtain the information, that if we are concerned about a possible illegality or abuse, then the Department will make it as difficult as possible for us to secure the information.

Mr. Elliff. I might add that it seems to be in the nature of the documents also, the more serious the allegation, the more resistance there is to providing us --

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They have given us a good many documents. They have not given us the documents on the controversial matters. They've given us plenty of documentation on less controversial matters.

The Chairman. I think it is ironic that the resistance we get from the Justice Department is so much more substantial than the resistance we have gotten from the CIA.

Senator Baker. That's not necessarily so. I agree with you the resistance is unfortunate and inappropriate, but I can think of a request for documentation from the CIA that is now more than a month old and they haven't had the good grace to tell us no. They have told us nothing.

The Chairman. But on the whole we've gotten a greater measure of cooperation from the CIA.

Senator Schweiker. I wonder, does either counsel know, Mr. Chairman, whether the Attorney General or the FBI Director initially confirmed whether they made any commitments to Congress about supplying documents or materials to the Committee?

Mr. Miller. Senator Mathias can tell you, and Senator Hart.

Senator Schweiker. Might there be a statement in their testimony in confirmation, in agreeing to furnish Congress with materials of this nature?

Senator Mathias. Yes, those statements were made, but let

me say, since my opinion has been asked, that I had a most discouraging talk with the Attorney General a couple of weeks ago. I went down to talk to him about privacy legislation and the Department of Justice at the moment is taking about as hard a line as any kind that I know of in the last fifteen years. Its whole kind of attitude --

Senator Tower. I just wonder if we shouldn't take this up with them.

The Chairman. I think we should, but I think we should also, in advance of that, in view of the kinds of signals we are now getting from the Justice Department, indicate that we believe that these objections that they are raising, or questions that they are raising, are a serious impediment procedurally to our Committee and that we have every intention of interviewing such agents as may be necessary, and that if necessary, we will subpoena them.

Mr. Elliff. Our feeling is it is preferable not to proceed by subpoena, but we do have a subpoena for one FBI agent which we brought with us today which we would like to proceed with.

The Chairman. Can you give us the facts of that case?

Mr. Epstein. This is an agent who is presently in Atlanta, Georgia, and the information we've received from other witnesses was that in 1964, I believe, he visited a newspaper editor in Atlanta, closed the door, put his hat on the desk, and said he

noted from reading The Constitution that we were picturing Dr. King as a moral leader and something of a hero and then this agent went on to talk in great detail about Dr. King's personal life which he claimed he had learned from a confidential source, and our interest in interviewing this agent obviously relates to the circumstances surrounding that visit to a newspaperman, who directed him to do that, what the purpose of that visit was, whether there was any documentation --

Senator Baker. Who was the newspaper man?

Mr. Epstein. His name was Eugene Patterson and he was with the Atlanta Constitution at that time. He's now with a newspaper in Florida.

The Chairman. Do you believe the subpoena now to be necessary because of what you have been told by the Justice Department?

Mr. Elliff. We have other agents which we would like to proceed with at the interview level, so we would like to proceed at both levels to get their reaction to both types of requests. What is their reaction to a subpoena going to be, what is their reaction to a renewed request to interview going to be?

So we crystallize each issue.

Senator Tower. I still think it might be good for us to hold that up until we talk about it, since they are coming in Tuesday morning or Tuesday sometime, it's not going to push things too far.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would it be useful, at least, if it is the feeling of the Committee to authorize you people, or Bill, today, to say that the Committee barely suppressed its outrage and that it won't do, and we will see you Tuesday? Don't wait till Tuesday.

The Chairman. I think something should be said, actually.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, it prejudges the hell out of it, but unless we get an extension to 1980 for this Committee --

The Chairman. I think you're right. Something needs to be said publicly that the Committee is determined that we feel that not only has time -- we've already said, we've already made public the letter we have sent. I think a follow-up needs to be that we are concerned that impediments that are now being suggested which would interfere with the Committee's right to interrogate witnesses, we do not intend to allow the Committee's work to be obstructed and if necessary we will be prepared to subpoena witnesses though we would hope that that would not have to be the case.

Senator Baker. And we are going to try to work it out from Tueday.

The Chairman. We're going to try to work it out from Tuesday.

Senator Baker. I have a business matter.

The Chairman. So does Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Just one point.

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There is this troublesome dictum in U.S. vs. Nixon about what might be nondiscoverable, all of which seems to bear on sort of foreign policy matters.

Am I correct -- I think we're going to hear a lot about that -- but am I correct in reading that decision that it really is almost stands wholly that they have the duty to produce all of the documentation and that case holds for that proposition, so that in our CIA matters, while they might raise some of this dictum, the FBI has no such defense, unless we're really trodding on those same grounds.

Mr. Epstein. Of course, there is another issue in the Bureau materials, because we're on the issue of investigative files, which has never been really litigated, and that is the propriety of Executive Privilege when it comes to that.

I might add that the importance of the issue of going to subpoena on these really raises that, because if we go to subpoena on documents, then that is going to be worthless unless we know in advance that we are going to win in court in a short period of time, including whether we have jurisdiction to be there.

Senator Mondale. In other words, you are saying they are going to raise the Executive Privilege defense, but that was the Nixon defense.

Mr. Epstein. I think that they would love for us to be in the position of having to issue a subpoena for documents,

because then it would be a year.

Mr. Schwarz. The problem is the Ervin Committee was found not to have jurisdiction to issue the subpoena.

The Chairman. Well, we know we're going to do the next step on that.

Now, may I raise one other point --

Senator Baker. That's not quite true. The Ervin Committee wasn't found to have no jurisdiction or standing to seek the documents or to issue subpoenas, but they failed to carry the burden of proving that it was required under the mandate of their inquiry.

Now, I have another matter, Frank.

The Chairman. We have two or three matters. Can I recognize Senator Mondale first, because he had asked it.

Senator Mondale. A few days ago, when the White House people were here, they showed us a document which we have in our files which disclosed that President Nixon in 1970 had ordered the delivery of three machine guns to some people in Chile and had done so with instructions that that order should go directly to some subordinate officials in CIA and should be done without advising the official channels. And it is thought that they were directed against a General Schneider, who was a top official in the Chilean government opposed to a coup. He was a Constitutionalist.

Schneider was killed, and there was a machine gun in the

possession of those who did so.

Now what I would like is, while we finish this cycle on assassinations, that we include among our studies of alleged assassinations this matter and we request the documentation, of all appropriate documents, under the category of assassination.

Mr. Schwarz. Senator, when that document came to our attention, we questioned a person who expands upon the allegations contained in the documents. I wrote a letter to the White House and the CIA. We wanted forthwith to receive copies of all such documents relating to the passage of weapons. We have had no response from the CIA.

Mr. Hills, we met with in the White House a week ago Tuesday or Wednesday, and I said we must have the documents and he said you cannot have them until you have the briefing on Chile, because we refuse to accept this as an assassination plan.

The Chairman. May I make this suggestion, Senator Mondale?

First of all, I believe that it is absolutely imperative that the Committee complete its investigation on the issue of the assassination of foreign government leaders before the recess and issue its report. That puts us under great pressure, but if we don't do it, I am going to ask the Committee to stay on the job. I would like very much to go to China, that is my first opportunity in forty years to go to China, and I have

such a trip laid on, but I am going to set it aside and ask the Committee to continue its work right into the recess until this is done. Otherwise, we are in a hopeless situation.

Senator Schweiker. I think, Mr. Chairman, if we don't finish it by then, we never will.

tape 1b

The Chairman. We never will!

I think we should look into this assassination, it is an assassination. I think it's part of our responsibility to look into it. But it is not an assassination, whatever the CIA input may have been, it is not an assassination of a head of state, and so therefore I don't want it to further delay the completion of this phase of our inquiry.

Now with that in mind, I am in full accord with what Senator Mondale says.

Senator Schweiker. Could we put it to another phase and not in this phase?

The Chairman. Yes, we are going to have a phase on Chile, anyway. It would fit into the Chilean case.

Senator Mondale. It is significant because if we accept their interpretation that it is not assassination, then we avoid an understanding that we had that these documents, all supposed to be available, then we get into a discovery problem.

In other words, I know what we're getting at, and I would guess that we should proceed as rapidly as possible, but we shouldn't hold up the cycle of --

Senator Schweiker. Well Fritz, there is another question along the same lines, and that is why I don't want to see it cloud this issue, and that is the Glomar Explorer, stopped by the NLRB proceeding was shown to have stopped in Chile just about a week or so before Allende was killed, just by coincidence for mechanical repairs. I would like to find out that one, too.

But this is a whole new thing. This puts us into the Chile thing. Because I'm just as interested as you are. I don't see that it hurts anything to put it in a Phase II proposition with Chile.

The Chairman. And Fritz, we can say that the Committee regards it in the category of assassination, but we can differentiate it from the initial report, which does deal with foreign leaders.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, before you go to a new subject -- and I am uneasy raising this -- but your reply reminds me, you say that we are going to conclude assassinations and issue our report before we go on recess. I think that disposes too readily of the problem that is going to confront us in a very few weeks, and that is having heard all of this, now what do we do? I don't think we have decided yet how we are going to present, once we open the doors, we've got to know how we are going to handle it. I don't think we ought to lock ourselves in at the moment to a written report, as we leave town

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the first of August.

Senator Baker. I agree with you 100 percent.

The Chairman. This Committee has got to get its business done and I know the purpose of the delay downtown is to make it as difficult as possible for us to cope with our work. We will be engulfed completely if we cannot deal with this phase of our work in the time that we have given it and put it over until the fall. What I'm suggesting is not just simply the report of the Committee. We are going to complete our witnesses, [illegible] we have time to issue such a report.

I am also suggesting the recommendations the Committee will make with respect to this issue. We have to put this behind us. It is just folly not to do it, because we must get on with the other phases of the report and there is no reason we cannot do it. If we can't do it by the end of this month, then we're not going to be any more advantaged or any better advantaged to then go out on our recess and come back and take it up anew in the fall. It is a very clear-cut issue.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But what is not clear-cut to me is how we report to our peers.

The Chairman. We will take that up.

Senator Schweiker. We discussed that at one meeting. We had a little informal meeting. Maybe you missed that, Phil.

The Chairman. There is nothing that could be gained by putting it off or defering it or postponing it. It is very

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clear that we are working at a highly intensified pace in order to get the necessary evidence, and then there is no reason why we can't address ourselves to this question.

Senator Hart of Michigan. The only reason that I raise that is that I am as anxious to conclude this chapter, but this Committee, as a Committee, then must decide the ultimate question: do you have open hearings? Do you go to a closed Senate?

The Chairman. That will be a top item of consideration for the Committee. I have only deferred this discussion thinking that we had best get all of the evidence first. That is all. Then we will take it up at an appropriate time and discuss it.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the situation to be then it is your hope that we will finish our Executive Session testimony before the August recess, but not a report to the Senate?

The Chairman. No, that is not my position. My position is that we should complete the testimony and make our report and recommendation on this issue.

Senator Baker. But without prejudice to a future determination of whether we have public hearings?

The Chairman. Oh, yes, that's always open to us. But I -- let me make it -- let's not have any misunderstanding there.

It is always open to this Committee to decide whether public hearings on this or any other issue should be arranged in

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the fall. Obviously, we cannot have them until fall.

My personal position is against public hearings on the issue of assassination. But what I am proposing is that the Committee make its report, and I think that is a question the Committee will have to take up and decide, and I think the appropriate way to disclose these facts, and I personally believe they must be disclosed, is through a report of the Committee that is made public, and I think that report should be made before the recess.

Senator Baker. I don't think we can do that.

Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, physically we have got three weeks. Whether we can hear all of these witnesses and sit down and prepare the report and have the Committee agree on the report, report it to the Senate and have the Senate act on it in three weeks is questionable in my mind. I, like you, want to do it, but I wonder if we can do a workmanlike job and do it in that time.

The Chairman. Well, let me say this, that the very request that Senator Baker has made, and I hope we don't get into a too prolonged discussion on this issue because we cannot decide it right now, but the very report that Senator Baker has asked for is now in the process of preparation. That report gives, by necessity, as much of the meat, the briefs that Senator Baker has asked for, as much of the report, laying out the factual, the evidence that the Committee has seen. And I think

this can be done. I know that we have to work very hard to do it, but I know that our position will be much worse in every way if we fail to do it.

Now without trying to decide that now, let us proceed.

Senator Schweiker. May I make one comment on that, Mr. Chairman?

I have had vacillating feelings on public hearings, and I think what I have come down on is this. I think we should go ahead and issue a preliminary report without public hearings. I think we should put the matter of public hearings in abeyance until we get into the Chile thing and some of the other areas of so-called assassinations that may not be Presidential assassinations per se and leave the Committee option that we may well want to elect to go into what happened in Chile publicly and bring up that assassination if that is what we determined.

I have trouble determining at this point in time whether we should have public hearings, and I think we ought to keep that option open as we go along.

The Chairman. I have no argument with the Senator on that score.

Senator Schweiker. I know. As I say, it reconciles with your views and it protects the rights of those who say they want public hearings.

The Chairman. I have no argument with that.



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Senator Baker has another matter.

Senator Baker. It won't take but a brief moment.

I think I owe the Committee a report on the statement that I made to the Press a few moments ago. I did not intend to make a statement, but that it becomes impossible to avoid when you step outside in these circumstances.

The Chairman. It is a good thing for you that Senator Morgan is not present.

Senator Baker. As some of you may know, the news last night and again this morning carried a story to the effect that a Colonel, a retired Colonel in the Air Force by the name of Fletcher Prowdy, has alleged by Alexander Butterfield was an associate or an employee or a plant of something of the sort of the CIA when he was at the White House.

I was asked if I had any comment on that. I was asked if I was surprised by that, and my reply was I had heard that story before. I had never commented on it because I had no proof of it. And it's really so. As you know, in this town if you don't have confirmation of it you get into deep trouble.

Second, that I think it is worthy of looking into, and I said I thought the Prowdy statement added a new dimension to the rumors and I thought that it did warrant further investigation, that I would recommend that to this Committee at the appropriate time.

The Chairman. That is fine, and I have also said that I would ask the Committee for an investigation of this charge, and Bill Miller tells me we have already received from the Agency a preliminary report that is not satisfactory. We are pursuing it and getting further information.

Senator Schweiker?

Senator Schweiker. I have a brief matter I would like to seek the Committee's advice on.

Could we go off the record a minute?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have an item of business also.

When I was in Europe last week and pursuant to the direction of the Chairman and staff I tried to contact our friend QJWIN to try to wrap up that link of the chain with, I must say, the complete cooperation of the CIA and Mr. Colby, who in fact sent a person over there to help uncover this individual. We know who he is and where he is.

The CIA American contact talked to him, largely for the reason that he feels extreme loyalty still to the Agency and to one or two particular people that he worked with and through. He opted not to meet with me or anybody else. The feeling is, both on my part and Mr. Colby's, that if we got his contact in that chain to get in touch with him directly that he would talk

to us, and I leave it to the Committee whether this is important enough for us to pursue and it would probably involve a couple of people going back over.

Senator Baker. What is your recommendation?

Senator Hart of Colorado. My own feeling, based almost purely on the principle that no stone should be left unturned is that we should do it.

There are some unanswered questions. He was here in the states in '63, he was not confined to one operation and we don't know what he was doing.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would recommend that we commission Senator Hart to do that for us.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It would take the cooperation of one of the witnesses we've had here before to do it.

The Chairman. What is your recommendation, Senator Hart, I'm sorry?

Senator Hart of Colorado. That we should do it, that we should get the cooperation of Mr. O'Donnell.

The Chairman. That we should do what?

Senator Baker. Interview QJWIN in Europe.

Senator Mathias. Which means somebody has to do it and take O'Donnell with him.

Senator Baker. Take Mathias and Hart.

The Chairman. It is a very sensitive matter, if his cover -- well, one thing this Committee must worry about --

Senator Schweiker. What would you hope to get out of it, Gary?

Senator Hart of Colorado. What his orders were, what his scope of authority was, what he was doing over and above -- well, what he was doing in the Congo, what he was doing over and above his Congo operations, why he was in Florida in 1963.

The Chairman. Well, Gary, when you told me this, you told me that this man had said to the CIA go between who was trying to arrange this interview that first of all he preferred not to be questioned, and secondly, if he were questioned, he would lie.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That was on the basis of the appointment we were trying to arrange then, and that was purely because of his loyalties to the Agency. The case was not presented well to him. What I am saying is if we took back his contact for whom he feels loyalty and the fellow should talk, I think the feeling of the person who had made the original contact is that he would talk.

It was not presented to him in the way that the Agency wanted him to do it.

The Chairman. How valuable do you think this information is to the Committee? I'll tell you my concern. My concern is the one thing I have feared more than anything else, in this investigation is that we take some action that allows them to say that we have blown the cover of some valuable agent abroad,

and this is what they feared all along, and the whole intelligence apparatus would be gravely weakened and the men in the field would be jeopardized by investigation of this kind.

We take that chance with this kind of -- and what do we learn from it? Is it worth that chance?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, that question could be asked of any witness that we have in here. Number two, the CIA, Mr. Colby and the Chief of Station in Amsterdam have no doubts that this can be carried out without any security breach whatsoever. Now that's the CIA. He has not worked for them in ten years.

The Chairman. And the CIA would be the first to jump upon the breach and say, we told you so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, I leave it to the Committee. I can't tell you what we're going to find out, it may be zero.

Senator Mathias. The Station Chief does not raise that as one of the dangers.

Senator Baker. Yes, they did.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Nor does Colby.

Mr. Wides. Mr. Chairman, excuse me. The paper that suggests the possibility that Mr. Win might have been in the United States in 1963 is a paper involving the activity records of William Harvey who will be here this afternoon and that may be that you can get more testimony under oath from him that will

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shed some light as to whether he was just using QJWIN as a cover which is what he told me, the designation for billing, or whether he's willing to give out some more testimony.

The Chairman. Well, let us get that additional information --

Senator Baker. One further point, Mr. Chairman, that might be of interest if my memory is correct, and I believe it is correct, is that the major commercial cover for the Agency in Amsterdam was run by the Mullin Company.

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Senator Hart of Colorado. Frank, he's not worked for the Agency in ten years. He's not an active agent.

The Chairman. Suppose that he were to tell us something that is of importance, then how do we cross-examine him? Then we have to bring him here for cross-examination, then we have blown his cover.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I say one other thing? I meant to say it, and I frankly forgot, just so my colleagues know what I'm about and not that I'm doing it behind their back.

I got a call last night from one of the editors of Harper's magazine in Europe relaying to me that Bernard Barker wanted to talk to me, and he thinks about the Butterfield situation, and I intended to call him, but I wanted you to know that.

The Chairman. That's fine.

Let's defer decision right now, on that decision, Senator

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Hart.

Let's get our witness back and complete his testimony this morning.

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(Whereupon, at 12:00 noon the witness re-entered the hearing room.)

The Chairman. All right.

You understand that the oath still applies to this part of the testimony?

Mr. Schwarz will renew the questioning.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to call your attention now to 1963, the Missile Crisis is over. Was there another reassessment of Cuban policy in the winter and spring of '63?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, there was.

Mr. Schwarz. Again, did that reassessment of Cuban policy involve a lot of reassessment of a lot of options?

Mr. Bundy. That is my refreshed recollection.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

We've shown you a lot of documents, mostly by you in that period, but some to you as well, and was one of the options the consideration of the possibility that Mr. Castro might defect or might be communicated to in a way that would bring him around more closely to the United States?

Mr. Bundy. The question of opening communications with Fidel Castro arises in 1963, I think at more than one time, and without having my attention drawn to specific documents, I wouldn't be able to spell that out very much.

Mr. Schwarz. But you agree that it is in there, and it is in there?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now did you also consider, in the spring of 1963, as you had in the fall of 1961, what would happen if Castro died or were killed?

Mr. Bundy. What we did, we certainly posed the question, the precise form is not clear to me, but what I now know from the documents you have shown me, is we posed to the Director of the Office of National Estimates, a Dr. Sherman Kent --

Mr. Schwarz. And what did Dr. Sherman Kent say in response to that inquiry?

Mr. Bundy. Well, I would have to look at his response.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

I would like to then mark a string of documents so you can have that in front of you.

All right, would you mark as item 6, Bundy item 6, the Bundy memorandum to the President dated January 4, 1963, which appears at Bundy Tab K.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit No. 6 for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. I'll mark a string, Mr. Bundy, and if Mr. Kelley could put it in front of you, we'll then talk about them.

As Bundy Exhibit 6-A, the memorandum for the record, Meeting on Cuba, 3 April '63, between the President, the Attorney General, yourself and five or six other people.

Mr. Bundy. Right.

(The document referred to was marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 6-A for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-B, the Special Group minutes of April 11, 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit No. 6-B for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 6-C, the memorandum also dated April 11, 1963 from Mr. Gordon Chase to yourself, headed Cuban Policy.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-C for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-D, the minutes of a meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-D for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-E the Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting, April 23, 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-E for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-F, the memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Subject, Cuba Policy, dated April 23, 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-F for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-G, the Agenda for the meeting of the Standing Group, meeting Tuesday, April 30th, the document being dated April 29th and signed by you.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-G for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. 6-H, the memorandum for members of the Standing Group dated May 2, 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-H for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. Finally, as Bundy 6-I, the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, May 13th, 1963, draft memorandum, Subject: Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death.

(The document referred to was marked as Bundy Exhibit 6-I for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Now, have you had a chance to read them again, Mr. Bundy?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. In summary, Mr. Bundy, is it a fair characterization of these papers that you were, and the Standing Group was, examining the question of what the situation would be if Castro were to die?

Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were examining, certainly.

Mr. Schwarz. That was a gamut of matters I tried to pose at the beginning of this line of questioning?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. That was one of the things you were considering?

Mr. Bundy. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. This was a period of time, as the fall of 1961 may also have been, when people asked about or talked about assassinations as a means of causing Mr. Castro's death.

Mr. Bundy. I am not aware of much conversation on that subject in the spring of '63, so I would have to take your word on that.

Mr. Schwarz. I am asking you, I have no word on that.

Mr. Bundy. No, I don't think there was much discussion in the spring of '63 on that subject.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's see if we can agree on some

things first.

Can we further agree that the ultimate conclusion was that Castro's death would not be desirable for the United States?

Mr. Bundy. The recommendation, or the assessment, which comes back from the Office of National Estimates, makes it clear that the odds would be that, upon Castro's death, his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help take over control.

Then it goes on to say that there might be divisions and splits, but that it was unlikely that anti-Communist forces would be able to take over without extensive U.S. help and probably U.S. military intervention.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Now, I would like to avoid having to go through every single document.

Mr. Bundy. So would I.

Mr. Schwarz. And see if I could get you to agree with this statement. You do agree that you were looking at a situation that would exist as if Castro were killed?

Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were looking at.

Mr. Schwarz. And in connection with that, was his being killed by assassination one of the ways which you understood he might be killed?

Mr. Bundy. I don't have any recollection of that point, of it being on our minds.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Then why were you looking at the question of his being killed? Was there something known?

Mr. Bundy. I really don't have any independent of it. My sense of events in 1963 is that the internal pressure from within the Administration to "do something about Cuba" was very much lower. There was, however, external pressure. There was political pressure in the United States, critics of the Administration were making speeches about how not enough was being done and we must get rid of the Castro regime, and as I think I may have said earlier, and I would like to say now, I think that one reason for getting an estimate of this kind was to get it on record from the point of view of those who did not think we should be fussing with questions of assassination or anything like it, that it was not a sound policy, leaving aside its moral meaning and wider political meaning from the point of view of the narrow objectives we had in Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz. Who was taking the position that assassination could be --

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.

Mr. Schwarz. But someone was?

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.

Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection of any position being taken pro or con?

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specific



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conversation or position that triggered this particular inquiry.

The Chairman. Well, isn't it perfectly plausible that this inquiry sought to examine what the situation would be in the event of Castro's death by whatever means it might occur?

Does it necessarily follow that because the Administration was making such a plausible inquiry against such a contingency that might arise at any time that therefore it was within the mind of the Administration to kill Castro? I don't see the connection.

Mr. Bundy. Well, you make my point, Mr. Chairman. That's just my point.

Mr. Schwarz. Now in connection with that, would you look at your own Agenda for the April 19th meeting, 6-G?

Under item 1 -- you distinguish between item 1 and item 2. Item 1 is the possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives; and item 2 is programs that might be initiated by the United States government.

I call your attention to the fact that the reference to the possible death of Castro is one of the items under item 1 and not under item 2.

Mr. Bundy. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And do you regard that as relevant to the exchange you had with the Chairman just now?

Mr. Bundy. It seems to me it bears out the Chairman's



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point, that you have a number of possible things that might happen, that you would then have something to do something about, or to act in the light of. The other are the things that you might do without waiting for some contingency to arise.

Mr. Schwarz. Now the only remaining question I have on this group of documents is, how was it that the subject of the death of Castro -- do you investigate the possibilities of the death of foreign leaders as a regular matter?

Mr. Bundy. Well, the question, "After Stalin, What?" was the staple of discussions in the 1940's, everywhere, academies and I would assume inside the United States government; the question after DeGaulle was a question about Western European policy for a great many years. And one could pick smaller figures, more and less controversial, and have the same kind of question coming up, in a situation in which a particular individual is as dominant a figure in a set of events which it had the two, quite contrasting but heavy consequences of the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis, it doesn't seem to me to be an irrational question to ask, without any relation as to whether the United States itself would have any active advisory role or any role whatever in having that event come to pass.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Would you mark as Exhibit 7 the September 20 document -- which is the page -- which states the assassination of Castro

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was excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit No. 7 for identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, would you take over the questioning of Mr. Bundy, with the permission of the Chairman, on that particular series of documents, which is at the heading, September 20th '63 on the chronology.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Let me show Mr. Bundy the documents.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, first, will you tell us where the documents are, because I couldn't find them under the heading you gave us.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

In Bundy Book 2, there is at Tab A the memorandum dated July 25th, 1963 from Mr. George Denney to Mr. Crimmins, entitled "Cuba, Possible Courses of Action.

At Tab B of Bundy Book 2 is a memorandum dated September 20th, 1963, from Gordon Chase to Mr. Bundy, and this memorandum summarizes the Denney memorandum of July 25th.

Mr. Bundy, did you review these documents with members of the staff earlier this week?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I did.

Mr. Kelley. Do you have any independent recollection of these documents?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I read a document of this kind, which comes to me from a member of my own staff, I am very often reminded and I am in this case, that this is a document which I did review and that it reflects his arguments as I then heard

them.

Mr. Kelley. Who was Mr. Gordon Chase?

Mr. Bundy. Well, he was an assistant of mine at the time with special responsibilities for Cuban affairs, and perhaps more widely in Latin America. He was at that time a foreign service officer secunded to the White House.

Mr. Kelley. Did he have any responsibility for covert actions?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Kelley. Did he provide staff assistance to you with respect to the Special Group or the Special Group (Augmented)?

Mr. Bundy. Well, he may have done in some exceptional case when I needed his opinion on a matter, but in ordinary cases he would not have been party to Special Group work.

Mr. Kelley. What kind of things did he do with the special responsibility for Cuba? What did that involve?

Mr. Bundy. He would be keeping in touch with the Cuban Task Force, which by this time was in the Department of State, the MONGOOSE operation having been disbanded. He would have been responsible for keeping me alert to matters that were proceeding in that Task Force that might have an implication for the White House.

Mr. Kellay. Who was the head of the Cuban Task Force?

Mr. Bundy. Well I don't want to get this wrong, but I think by this time it was Mr. Crimmins.

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Mr. Kelley. Mr. Crimmins was in the State Department and he was a foreign service officer?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. Kelley. The Cuban Task Force, what was that?

Mr. Bundy. Well, it was the successor to the MONGOOSE group, but much less oriented toward secret operations than MONGOOSE, and the review of secret operations then came back under the complete control of the Special Group, by now, I think, called the 303 Committee, which was a lineal successor of 5412.

Mr. Kelley. I call your attention now to Mr. Denney's memorandum, which is at Tab A in Book 2, and it is true, is it not that the memorandum is to Mr. Crimmins?

Mr. Bundy. Right.

Senator Tower. Do you have any independent recollection of this memorandum?

Mr. Bundy. I have no knowledge that I ever saw it, and I did not find it familiar when I looked at it the other day.

Mr. Kelley. It is true, is it not, that Mr. Chase's memo to you summarizes this much longer memorandum by Mr. Denney?

Mr. Bundy. Is that what it is?

Mr. Schwarz. Does it do that, Mr. Kelley, because Chase memorandum starts by saying, here is a summary of Paul Sakwa's memorandum.

Mr. Kelley. I think that is an error in Mr. Chase's memo, because it is clear that what is being summarized here is Mr.

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Denney's memorandum.

Mr. Bundy. Let me suggest that you focus on Mr. Chase's memorandum, with respect to my recollection and responsibility, that is clearly the operative document.

Mr. Kelley. With respect to Mr. Chase's memorandum, in his summary of the rationale of proposals, he states, as second, "the present importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's martyrdom."

Do you have any recollection of why he would exclude assassination? Does that imply to you, or do you recollect, whether Castro's assassination was being considered and here is a staff paper excluding it, because someone asked them to consider it?

Mr. Bundy. No, I think it's a simple statement of what I would regard as a rationale assessment of the situation by whoever the original author was, and certainly by the staff man with respect to a subject that emerges directly from the notion that he is an operational target, whatever that means and goes on to say, but we don't mean assassination, because it would make him a martyr, what other reasons against that there may be. It doesn't seem to me that you can read the statement that assassination is excluded as an inference that somebody else is including it.

Mr. Kelley. That's all.

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Mr. Schwarz. In any event, Mr. Bundy, the document says it is excluded.

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Mr. Schwarz. Now at that period of time in the fall of 1963, were you aware that through the offices of Ambassador Atwood, or Mr. Atwood, as he may have then been called, and through the offices of a French journalist called Jean Daniel, another effort was being made to establish contact with Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I remember the Atwood effort, as I recollect that he came to see me about it. I don't recollect specifically Jean Daniel, although it strikes a chord as you mention it.

Mr. Schwarz. What the purpose, very briefly, of Mr. Atwood's effort?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understood it, he had been approached by someone he knew from Cuba and had been given to understand that there was interest in, Castro had an interest in, opening communication, and he was exploring with us whether he could be encouraged to undertake such an explanation.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you encourage him?

Mr. Bundy. The exact form of our message to him, or our if you want to call it, the instruction to him, the President's decision, I can no longer recollect, but my impression is that we were interested, and that we did want him to explore it without engaging the President any more than he could help.



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Mr. Schwarz. But was the President in fact informed and in fact approved the actions taken?

Mr. Bundy. That is my understanding.

Mr. Schwarz. Is it your understanding or your recollection?

Mr. Bundy. It is my recollection, but it is a recollection that is refreshed by what I have learned and hearing more about it in the last few days.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, were you told, in the fall of 1963, that assassination devices had been requested by a Cuban for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro, and that assassination devices were offered to the Cuban in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now again, here, calling for a matter of opinion, as a matter of opinion, do you believe that at the same time, at a possible rapprochement with Mr. Castro was being pursued, the President would have authorized or permitted the passage of assassination devices intended for their use on Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.

Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Castro.

The Chairman. Is there more?

Mr. Schwarz. Well, on Trujillo and Diem, with respect to Diem --

Mr. Smothers. Well, if you're going on to something else, there are a couple of things.

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Going back to an earlier memorandum which I don't believe is in the Bundy materials, but it has been talked about previously in a Committee hearing, a memorandum which will be identified as a Memorandum for the Record, dated 16 October 1962, a memorandum signed by Mr. Richard Helms.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit No. 8 for identification.)

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Mr. Smothers. Mr. Bundy, I am going to read through this memorandum and ask you a couple of questions about that. It's a memorandum from Helms for the record on MONGOOSE.

Reading from this memorandum, Mr. Bundy, reading from Paragraph 2: "The Attorney General" -- well, let me read the entire paragraph.

"The Attorney General opened the meeting" -- we're talking about a MONGOOSE meeting -- by expressing the general dissatisfaction of the President," --"'dissatisfaction of the President'" in quotes -- "with Operation MONGOOSE."

Mr. Bundy. What date are we at? The date?

Mr. Smothers. The date of the memorandum is 16 October 1962.

"He pointed out that the Operation had been underway for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence, but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the weekly meetings of top officials on this problem, and again noted the small accomplishments, despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal

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appointment by the President a year ago.

"The Attorney General then stated that in view of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more personal attention. In order to do this, he would hold a meeting every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational representatives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwich, Ryan and General Johnson)."

Now, the best of our information, Mr. Bundy, is that these meetings were in fact held on a daily basis as indicated, and that they did involve Lansdale and these members of the working group noted.

Were you aware of such meetings?

Mr. Bundy. I have no independent recollection of them, but that does not sound implausible to me at all.

Mr. Smothers. It doesn't sound implausible to me that the Attorney General Lansdale and members of the working group to develop MONGOOSE activities with him?

Mr. Bundy. To report to him how they were getting on, and to see if he couldn't, by listening to those reports and keeping a lively -- keeping his lively concern in their consciousness move the thing more rapidly.

Mr. Smothers. This is your interpretation of giving more personal attention to it?

Mr. Bundy. Exactly.

Mr. Smothers. You say you had no knowledge of these in

1962?

Mr. Bundy. I didn't say that. I said I had no independent recollection of them.

Mr. Smothers. They did not come to your attention at that point?

Mr. Bundy. I didn't say say that. I don't know that they did, but I don't know that they didn't.

Mr. Smothers. But your recollection at this point is that they did not come to your attention?

Mr. Bundy. That is not my recollection. I don't recall that one way or the other.

Mr. Smothers. Okay.

Let me ask you then about your knowledge of the Lansdale situation.

Do you know General Lansdale?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Do you know his reputation for truth and honesty?

Mr. Bundy. I don't think I have any -- his reputation for truth and honesty, if you ask me the question as one asks it about, you know, all kinds of people, I have no reason to question it. I have doubts about some of the things I have seen attributed to him in recent weeks.

Mr. Smothers. Well, let me put it this way. Would you believe General Lansdale under oath?

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Mr. Bundy. It would depend on what he said.

Mr. Smothers. It would depend upon what he said.

Is your experience that General Lansdale is trustworthy only on a selective basis?

Mr. Bundy. You are asking me questions about matters essentially in which his testimony, as I have seen it reported.

Mr. Smothers. No, I am not asking you about his testimony. I am asking you if you would believe him under oath, based on your knowledge.

Mr. Bundy. It would depend upon what he said, and if it was a matter on which I had my own knowledge.

Mr. Smothers. Without regard to matters that General Lansdale has testified to before this Committee, based on your knowledge of him, your working relationship with him, your knowledge of what other people know of General Lansdale, his reputation in the community, if you will, would you believe him under oath?

Mr. Bundy. I would currently have to say that I could not give you a definite affirmative answer to that question.

Mr. Smothers. That's fine.

Now, let's go back to the period of General Lansdale's appointment.

General Lansdale was appointed as the coordinator of the Special Group, the Chief of Operations.

After General Taylor's efforts had been under effort for

some time, six months, seven months, General Taylor comes in, I believe, in July after he completes his Bay of Pigs examination, General Lansdale is appointed by the President at the end of November.

Do you have any present recollection of the circumstances surrounding that appointment?

Mr. Bundy. None that goes beyond what I discussed earlier.

Mr. Smothers. To the best of your knowledge or recollection, did the appointment of this Chief of Staff or Chief of Operations reflect any lack of confidence in General Taylor on the part of either the Attorney General or the President?

Mr. Bundy. No, the opposite. General Taylor had heavy responsibilities in his general responsibility as military representative of the President. He was made Chairman of the Committee to keep oversight on this. It was inappropriate entirely in terms of his rank and his other duties that he should be the day to day action officer.

Mr. Smothers. Are you familiar with the degree of General Taylor's involvement with the development of the Special Group (Augmented) agendas? Was this done by General Taylor? Was it really General Lansdale's responsibility?

Mr. Bundy. I don't have any knowledge of the details of the operations of the staff. It was clear to me, and I think to everyone else, that the man in charge of that operation, of that Committee, was General Taylor.

Mr. Smothers. Okay.

Just one final series of questions.

If we might, Mr. Bundy, go back to our conversations regarding your request to see documents prior to your testimony before the Rockefeller Commission, when you talked to Mr. Kissinger, precisely what did you request of him?

Mr. Bundy. I said to him -- and again I cannot be precise -- and I thought that there were going to be questions with respect to which it would be much easier for me to give helpful and more accurate answers if I could have access to appropriate documents since I have taken no documents of that character, no official documents of that character, from the White House. And he said he entirely agreed and he made the appropriate arrangements.

Mr. Smothers. Did you ask for a timeframe for these documents?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that I did, but when I came to look more closely at what I needed to see, as I told you earlier, it related specifically to the period around August 1962.

Mr. Smothers. Did the White House make the selection of documents for you?

Mr. Bundy. No. The White House handed me a file of documents which covered the period.

Mr. Smothers. They handed you a file of documents covering roughly the August 1962 period?

Mr. Bundy. That's right.

Mr. Smothers. Had you made a request for documents covering this August '62 timeframe?

Mr. Bundy. I must have told him the rough period with which I am concerned. Again, I don't understand the drift of your question.

Mr. Smothers. Well, the drift of my question is, if indeed you selected the August 1962 documents, why did you select that?

Mr. Bundy. Because Counsel to the Rockefeller Commission had directed my attention to the period.

Mr. Smothers. To August 1962?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. In the file that centered roughly on this point in this timeframe, included NSA memo 181, was the file put together by the White House pursuant to this guidance?

Mr. Bundy. The file that came into my hands, whether they put it together or whether it was a file drawn off the shelf, I can't tell you. You'll have to ask them.

Mr. Smothers. Did it appear to you to be an off-the-shelf file?

Mr. Bundy. I don't know what it was.

The Chairman. What is the object of this series of questions, Curtis?

Mr. Smothers. Well, I am trying to determine, Mr. Chairman,

what Mr. Kissinger was requested to do and what actually happened.

The Chairman. Don't we have that now in the record? It just seems to me like we're going over the same series of questions.

Mr. Smothers. Well, since we don't know what was in the file --

Mr. Bundy. Well, I thought I said the file was a file of National Security Action memoranda, a file which you already have here.

Mr. Smothers. Relating to August, 1962?

Mr. Bundy. Uh-huh.

Mr. Smothers. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

tape 2b

Mr. Schwarz. On the Trujillo matter --

Mr. Bundy. Sure.

Mr. Schwarz. You know Mr. Trujillo was killed. Did you know or do you know that the persons who killed him had obtained some weapons from the United States?

Mr. Bundy. I did not know, and do not now know, of my own knowledge that that was the case.

I did know, or at least I believe I must have been on notice because of documents again that you have shown me, that weapons by a decision of the Special Group in early January had been or were being passed to Dominican dissidents.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you involved in the sending of a telegram

to the Domincan Republic, either two or three days prior to the actual assassination of Mr. Trujillo?

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of it, and when I saw those telegrams in discussions with your staff, they stirred no recollection on my part.

Mr. Schwarz. Is it fair to state that Mr. Richard Goodwin is the best witness on those subjects from the White House for that period of time?

Mr. Bundy. It appears that way to me, although that appears more from the fact that important documents seem to have been addressed to him than because of my own recollection that he was interested in the matters and because of my phone conversation with him, he showed a considerable familiarity with events in the Domincan Republic, political events during that spring.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, you got a memo from Mr. Bissell in February, 17th February '61. It is Tab R of the Trujillo Book 1 of 2, in which you were informed that the dissidents had been told by the United States that it was prepared to provide them with a limited supply of arms and equipment.

When you got such information, did it trigger in your mind anything to the effect of, let's be concerned about how they're going to use those weapons, or did you just accept the information and do nothing about it?

Mr. Bundy. It is clear that the information was sent to

me and it was clear, in that sense, that I had become responsible for knowing what was in the document, but I have to say that as I reread it I have no recollection that I ever, in fact, did read it at the time. Whether that was because of the flow, the very heavy flow of other documents or because I passed it to someone else or because I just simply didn't get to it, I cannot tell you, but I have no recollection that I saw it.

Mr. Schwarz. You did make a request for a briefing paper?

Mr. Bundy. It must have been done and it was either done in my name or I did it.

Mr. Schwarz. So you're not capable -- you don't remember it. Are you capable of making a comment on my question, which was having received information that arms had been supplied --

Mr. Bundy. Having that information on my desk, anyway.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

In the light of hindsight, should persons in your position when they receive such information inquire into the purpose for which the arms are to be used?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would -- and my own guess on this, and it's not much better than that, is that the decision which had been taken only a week before the new Administration came in, in the Special Group, was partly reviewed in some fashion, with the Special Group as reconstituted after the change in Administration. So I would have to say that I suppose I knew that weapons were being introduced into the Dominican Republic



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and I would have to add that I did not, or I have no recollection and I think I would recollect it, if I had engaged in a careful inquiry to find out just what, who, when where and so on did not do that, and I think -- you ask in hindsight, I think it would clearly be important to have that kind of understanding, because as I understand the evidence that has now been developed, there was a level of communication and connection with the plotters in the Dominican Republic which exceeded what political authority appears to have expected or believed was going on.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you agree with one further point, that it is very difficult for the United States to control events once it has made a decision to cooperate with dissident elements, and in particular once it's made a decision to cooperate with dissident elements by providing them with arms?

Mr. Bundy. I think that -- one thing, I don't want to generalize here, but I think -- I would agree with the generalization, let me put it that way, if I could add that in the case of the Dominican Republic, I think one has also to recognize retrospectively that there was no way to have any communication with dissidents that would not involve recognition that, if you propose to be an effective dissident in that country under that ruler, you would probably be contemplating fairly violent action.

Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Trujillo.

One question of Vietnam.

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You were involved in the question of the possible coup in Vietnam that actually took place?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And you were substantially involved in that as a matter of personal --

Mr. Bundy. I was working closely with the President and was probably the draftsman under his instruction of some of the cables that went out.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, Diem was killed. It does not appear to me from the record that the United States wanted him killed. Is that fair?

Mr. Bundy. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. But the United States did want him deposed if a coup could be successful? Is that correct?

Mr. Bundy. The United States really had two views. Right up to the end, the United States hoped, hoped against hope, as it became more and more difficult to communicate with Diem, that he would see the, or come to share the kinds of argument, that were made to him, primarily by Ambassador Lodge, and that a change in his government and a lower, much lower, role for his brother and sister-in-law would assist him in recapturing public confidence. That was always the preferred solution.

As prospects for that became more and more dim, the United States did come to take the view that there might be no alternative to a coup, and it certainly had the view that if there

was going to be a coup, I believe the language somewhere in one of the cables is that it was in the interests of the United States that it should succeed.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, on the day of the coup, Ambassador Lodge told Mr. Diem that he would provide help to get him out of the country and do so by airplane, but he couldn't have the plane for twenty-four hours. A. Did you know of the twenty-four hour point?

Mr. Bundy. I don't remember that we did.

Mr. Schwarz. B, don't you find it incomprehensible that the United States was not able to supply an airplane for twenty-four hours?

Mr. Bundy. I don't really know because it depends on where the plane was going to go, what kind of plane. I don't think I'm competent to answer that question.

What occurs to me is, there were lots of other ways of offering asylum for a twenty-four hour period, and I don't think I really find that a very significant point.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

If there are no further questions, I want to thank you for your testimony, it has been long, a very long morning, and it has been very helpful testimony. We appreciate it very much.

Mr. Bundy. And I am thankful to you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, if it is not inappropriate and there is no

objection, I have a brief statement that I intend to make to the Press which will simply re-emphasize to them what I think I have said a number of times this morning about my view of the role of President Kennedy and Attorney General Kennedy.

The Chairman. I leave that up to you. I certainly would not want to interpose any objection.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:42 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed.)

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